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Chapter 1:
Introduction, Problem and Method

Presidential rhetoric has become an important field of study for scholars. Political

scientists as well as communication researchers have long been interested in the role of
presidential speech. Particularly in the mass media age, what presidents say has a great

influence on our nation’s domestic and foreign affairs (Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, & Bessette,

1981). Presidents can communicate directly with the public using radio and television, and their
words can be carried via journalists to the public through a variety of newspapers, magazines and
other media outlets. The purposes of this presidential rhetoric are many: to inform the public of

policy initiatives, to persuade the public to support these policies, and often to engender support

for military action in foreign lands (Bostdorff, 1994; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Cherwitz &

Zagacki, 1986; Stuckey, 1995; Stuckey & Antczak, 1998; Windt, 1983). Presidents use the mass
media to appeal directly to the American public in order to announce or justify military action in
times of crisis — so much so that scholars have labeled “crisis rhetoric” as a specific genre of

presidential discourse. From the end of World War II until the 1990's, the Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union served as an important factor in presidential crisis rhetoric

(Ivie, 1997; Kane, 1991; Medhurst, 1997; Scott, 1997; Wander, 1984/1997).
Bill Clinton is the first president since World War II who has not had the Cold War as a

backdrop against which to paint his vision of foreign policy and military involvement. The fall
of the Soviet Union brought about many economic, social and political changes around the world
(Cole, 1999; LaFeber, 1994; Stuckey, 1995), and it is therefore important to ask several

questions regarding presidential crisis rhetoric. Without the Soviet Union as our arch-rival, how
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justified military action in times of crisis? Are there other metaphors or ideological
justifications besides the Cold War or the “fight” between communism and democracy? As

Clinton’s presidency winds down, scholars can begin to look at his rhetoric and to begin to
answer these and other questions. This study looks at President Clinton’s crisis rhetoric from a

dramatistic/metaphoric perspective in order to determine what justifications for military action
he uses (and other presidents might use in the future) now that the Cold War has ended.
Literature Review

Rhetoric and the Presidency
Presidential Rhetoric has been studied from several different perspectives. Medhurst
(1996) categorizes these perspectives into two main categories. One perspective looks at the
presidency as an arena in which rhetoric takes place; this is typically the domain of

communication scholars. The other looks at the institution of the presidency and how it has been
changed by the use of rhetoric; this, he says, has typically been the focus of political scientists.

Stuckey and Antczak (1998) agree that scholars from different disciplines have tended to focus

on different aspects of presidential discourse, with communication scholars focusing on
persuasion while political scientists focus on the impact of each president on the office of the

presidency itself. Medhurst (1996) labels the first perspective “presidential rhetoric” and the

second “the rhetorical presidency.” They are by no means mutually exclusive, as we shall see,
and scholars from different fields do not always limit themselves to one or the other, but they

serve to delineate the different lines of research.
Presidential rhetoric. The study of presidential rhetoric, according to Medhurst (1996), is
concerned with the dynamics of human persuasion. The principal area of study is rhetoric; the

presidency provides the situation within which the rhetoric takes place. Thus, scholars who
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approach presidential discourse from this perspective will investigate and explain certain

phenomena rather than others. Studies from this perspective typically focus on the strategies

used by presidents to communicate with the public.
Stuckey and Antczak (1998) point out that presidential communication has increased

dramatically in the twentieth century, particularly since World War II and the popularization of

the electronic media. Prior to the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson,
presidents’ roles as public speakers consisted mainly of ceremonial duties and the articulation of

American values (Fairbanks, 1981; Hart, 1977). These two presidents assumed more aggressive
roles as public speakers and campaigners, thus altering the public persona of the presidency

(Tulis, 1987). With the invention of radio and television, presidents began to communicate

directly with the public as never before (Stuckey, 1991). The change in the persona of the
presidency and changes in the mass media have contributed to a different kind of rhetoric and
different rhetorical strategies (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Hart, 1987; Stuckey, 1991). Thus,

in the last half of this century, presidents have had more opportunities and more reasons for
addressing the American public.

Campbell and Jamieson (1990) say that the rhetoric of presidents is strongly influenced
by precedent. The lines of argument available to presidents and the timing of their speeches,
they say, are narrowed by the expectations of the public based on what other presidents have

done. Thus, the rhetorical situation creates certain acceptable parameters for presidential

rhetoric. If reliance on precedent is one strategy, so to is reliance on the office itself. Zemicke
(1990) says that presidents use their office and its various roles strategically as a means of
persuasion. By reminding the public of their responsibility as leader of the nation, presidents are

able to generate credibility and establish themselves as symbols of national unity, thereby
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In other words, in order to accomplish domestic or foreign policy goals, presidents can “invoke”

their title in an effort to appear more like statesmen and less like politicians. Invoking precedent
and invoking the office, then, are two important rhetorical strategies used by presidents today.

While at times presidents use their prominence as a source of credibility, at other times
they use the strategy of anonymity. Presidents often covertly disseminate information by

attributing rhetoric to unidentified sources, thereby circumventing the public forum and
communicating untoward or self-serving messages (Erickson & Fleuriet, 1991). By attributing
information to anonymous sources, Erickson and Fleuriet say, journalists help presidents to
avoid taking responsibility for their rhetoric and, by extension, their actions.

We have only discussed a few of the strategies used by modem presidents to persuade the

public. Since the time of FDR, presidents have sought to use these strategies, and others, for
political gain; they have sought the public via the mass media not simply as an audience with

which to share their ideas, but as a tool for governance (Stuckey & Antczak, 1998). In order to
understand this, we turn to the concept of the rhetorical presidency.

The rhetorical presidency. According to Medhurst (1996), the primary concern of those
working with the construct of the rhetorical presidency has been largely institutional. Studies of
the rhetorical presidency typically seek to explain how presidential rhetoric has changed our

system of government. The “rhetorical presidency” is a term coined by Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis,
and Bessette (1981) which describes the modem presidency as one in which rhetoric is used as a

principal tool of governance. Presidents appeal directly to the people in order to create support

for various policies and actions, thereby putting pressure on the legislative branch (and
sometimes the judicial branch) to support presidential initiatives and actions (Ceaser et al., 1981;

Medhurst, 1996; Tulis, 1996; Stuckey & Antczak, 1998). In the words of Tulis (1996),
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Medhurst, 1996; Tulis, 1996; Stuckey & Antczak, 1998). In the words of Tulis (1996),
Nineteenth-century presidents directed their rhetoric principally toward Congress

in written messages that framed their partisan preferences in self-consciously

. constitutional language. By contrast, twentieth-century presidents regularly
appeal over the heads of Congress in oral performance designed for popular

appeal, (p. 4)

Ceaser et al. (1981) say that the rise of the rhetorical presidency came about due to three
factors: (a) a change in the doctrine of leadership, (b) the mass media, and (c) modem

campaigns. As mentioned previously, Woodrow Wilson was one of the first presidents to use
public speaking aggressively in an attempt to generate public opinion (Ceaser et al., 1981; Tulis,
1987). This new style of leadership, facilitated by the mass media, led to the prominence of
presidential rhetoric and the idea that words, not power or action, constitute presidential

leadership (Ceaser et al., 1981; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Medhurst, 1996; Stuckey &

Antczak, 1998; Tulis, 1987). Finally, a third factor in the rise of the rhetorical presidency was
the campaign style pioneered by Wilson and the Progressives who believed that the candidates,

not the parties, should be the main rhetorical instruments of elections; thus, politics became
more personal and presidents and presidential candidates were endowed with greater rhetorical

power (Ceaser et al., 1981; Jamieson, 1988).

Scholars who approach the rhetoric of presidents from this paradigm are concerned with
how presidents have used rhetoric to achieve specific political goals. The focus is on the
institution of the presidency and how its occupants have changed its nature. Specific aspects of

the presidency which have been studied from this perspective include the president’s ceremonial

role (Kellerman, 1984), the role of the mass media in presidential rhetoric (Denton, 1989;
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Gronbeck, 1995; Jamieson, 1988), and the president’s relationship with Congress (Chester,
1981).

In short, the rhetorical presidency is a concept which has been used to explain the nature

of presidential rhetoric from the perspective that presidents appeal to the public in order to gain

support with Congress that they otherwise might not have. By “going public,” presidents often
succeed in generating favorable public opinion on a variety of issues. One specific area in which

presidents appeal directly to the public in an attempt to influence Congress to support executive
activities is in the arena of what communication scholars have labeled “crisis rhetoric.”

Crisis Rhetoric
Kiewe (1994) defines crisis rhetoric as “the discourse initiated by decision makers in an

attempt to communicate to various constituents that a certain development is critical and to

suggest a certain course of action to remedy the critical situation” (p. xvii). Presidential crisis
rhetoric, Kiewe says, consists of the discourse created between the president, the press and the
public that serves to legitimize or delegitimize a situation as critical. The definition of what

constitutes a crisis is determined by the president — political or international crises, therefore, are
primarily rhetorical in nature (Bostdorff, 1991, 1994; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Kiewe, 1994;

Windt, 1983). In other words, certain situations may or may not exist in the world, but they do

not become crises until presidents describe them as such. Finally, the “action” taken to remedy
the “critical situation” is often military in nature; thus, crisis rhetoric is used by presidents to

justify military action. The literature on crisis rhetoric typically focuses on this aspect (see, for

example, Bostdorff, 1991, 1994; Cherwitz and Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989; Heisey, 1986; Kiewe,
1994; Windt, 1983).
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As Campbell and Jamieson (1990) point out, rhetorical forms follow institutional

conventions and the precedents set by other presidents. Specific genres of presidential discourse
(including State of the Union Addresses, Inaugural Addresses, etc.) are important to study

because these forms become ritualized, and through them presidents enact the role of symbolic
and real head of state (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). Crisis rhetoric — or what Campbell and
Jamieson call war rhetoric — is one genre of presidential rhetoric. Several scholars have

described the characteristics of crisis rhetoric as a genre, thereby explaining and interpreting

patterns in presidential discourse.
Windt (1983) describes presidential crisis rhetoric as having three defining

characteristics. First, he says, presidents make authoritative statements in which they assert a

control over “new facts” which constitute a crisis. A given situation has changed in such a way,
presidents argue, as to constitute a critical situation demanding decisive action. Second, Windt

says, presidents relate the new situation to a larger ongoing battle between good and evil.
Presidents portray the enemy as evil and amoral through a melodramatic comparison between

the pure motives of the United States and the evil motives of the enemy. Third, presidents call

for the public to understand that enactment of a specific policy and public support for that policy
are moral acts. By elevating crisis situations to ideological levels, Windt says, presidents make

them tests of character, will, and moral strength.
Bostdorff (1991) finds four characteristics common to crisis rhetoric. First, she says,

presidents personify an enemy, which serves as a condensation symbol of evil. This enemy is
portrayed as threatening victims whom our military must protect. Second, presidents express a

sense of urgent direction. If the situation is portrayed as desperate, Congress of course has no
time to deliberate military action and the president must act immediately. Thus, the
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announcement of military action is made after the fact. Third, presidents must document the evil

deeds of the enemy. This documentation serves to support presidential assertions as well as to
justify presidential actions after the crisis has been resolved. Lastly, Bostdorff says, crisis

rhetoric uses intervention — the dramatization of action taken against the enemy. Through

intervention, presidents emphasize symbolic and tangible gains while downplaying or ignoring
negative aspects. This serves to reassure the public that the president is in control and acting
appropriately.

Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) have delineated two types of crisis rhetoric. The first they
call consummatory crisis rhetoric, which consists of presidential responses to foreign crises that

do not include military action by the United States. The second — justificatory crisis rhetoric —
they define as rhetoric designed to justify the use of military action on the part of the United

States. There are several similarities between the two types of crisis rhetoric: both attempt to
create crisis atmospheres while seeking resolution, both underscore the importance of American

ideals and values, and both make use of “deliberate, hard-hitting, offensive language” (p. 309) to
dramatize the crisis. Cherwitz and Zagacki say that both forms of crisis rhetoric are epideictic in
nature — they are concerned with placing blame for crisis situations on America’s enemies.

However, they say, consummatory crisis rhetoric is also forensic — seeking to put perpetrators of
hostile actions on mock trial by presenting evidence to prove their guilt —while justificatory

crisis rhetoric has deliberative dimensions — with United States military actions being explicated

and defended.

Cherwitz and Zagacki’s (1986) justificatory crisis rhetoric is similar to what Campbell
and Jamieson (1990) call war rhetoric — the rhetoric used by presidents to justify to the American
public the use of military force. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) say that presidential war
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rhetoric has five characteristics: (a) the decision to use force is portrayed as a last resort that has

been deliberated at great length, (b) it is justified through a narrative of events from which
argumentative claims are drawn, (c) the audience is exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total
commitment, (d) the rhetoric justifies the legitimacy of the president as commander in chief as

well as the use of military force, and (e) the misrepresentation of facts plays a strategic role.
Campbell and Jamieson apply the term war rhetoric to speeches announcing military action that
has already occurred as well as to speeches requesting Congress to declare war officially. While
the study of crisis rhetoric typically focuses on the first of these distinctions, it must be noted, as

Campbell and Jamieson point out, that no war has been officially declared since World War II.

It is significant to note this fact for several reasons.
First, presidents have all but usurped the power to declare war from Congress. Each time
a president exercises his role as commander in chief by ordering forces into combat without
prior approval of Congress, he legitimizes future occurrences of similar actions by other

presidents (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). Second, by taking military action and then seeking the
support of the public, presidents stifle debate and further consideration of their announced policy

(Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Dow, 1989; Windt, 1983). They also put pressure on Congress to

support these actions, since presidents who use crisis rhetoric can typically be expected to

receive the support of the public and to increase their credibility (Bostdorff, 1991, 1994;
Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Windt, 1983).

The use of crisis rhetoric — particularly crisis rhetoric intended to justify and gain popular
support for military action — has changed the nature of the presidency. While in the past
presidents were more likely to seek formal declarations of war before using military force, they
now use the military in situations they deem critical, then appeal to the American people in order
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Windt, 1983). The powers of war have shifted from the legislative to the executive branch
(Bostdorff, 1991). This phenomenon did not exist before the rise of the rhetorical presidency —

the rhetorical presidency has created an atmosphere in which crisis rhetoric thrives.
Cold War Rhetoric

A major factor in the political atmosphere of crisis rhetoric for over 40 years was the

concept known as the Cold War. The Cold War has been defined as a state of tension and
rivalry between nations which stops short of actual full-scale war (Scott, 1997). The term was
first used by Bernard Baruch on April 16, 1947; the phrase was repeated by journalist Walter

Lippmann and was readily accepted by the public as an accurate description of the state of
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (Kane, 1991). Though allies during

World War II, friendly relations between the two nations began to dissolve after Joseph Stalin

used the Soviet army to control much of Eastern Europe, and president Harry S. Truman moved
to unite Western Europe under American leadership (LaFeber, 1994). The result was a situation
of intense political and ideological tension so aptly described as the Cold War.

It has been argued that the Cold War was fundamentally a rhetorical creation and
ultimately a non-event (Kane, 1991; Messer, 1982). However, as Scott (1997) points out, the

Cold War was not entirely a war of words; actions (such as the U. S. boycott of the 1980 summer
Olympics and the embargo of grain shipments to the Soviet Union) also played an important part

in the Cold War. And the Cold War “heated up” from time to time — most notably during the
Korean and Vietnam wars. However, the majority of Cold War actions were rhetorical in nature

and the Cold War itself was primarily created through the rhetoric of the two rival nations (Kane,

1991; Scott, 1997).
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The origins of Cold War rhetoric — and the Cold War itself — can be traced to the Truman
administration. According to Kane (1991), during Truman’s term

differences between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cast in a

harsh rhetoric characterized by magnified and expansive terms; a divisive and
uncompromising tone which exaggerated differences and minimized common

interests; and an active narrative which redefined events and claimed the
superiority of the American experience, (p. 81)

This characterization of the two rivals blossomed in the Truman years and was adapted over
time (Parry-Giles, 1994). According to Parry-Giles, rhetorical strategies under Truman first
focused on communicating the superiority of the American way of life. When this was found to

be ineffective, rhetorical strategies switched to an emphasis on denouncing the evils of

communism and literalizing the savagery and brutality of the Soviets. This strategy was also
ineffective, according to Parry-Giles, because it created fear of communism and empowered

America’s Cold War enemy. Finally, Parry-Giles says that Eisenhower was able to overcome the

flaws in these strategies by establishing the United States as a scientific superpower determined
to achieve peace, in comparison with the Soviet enemy bent on conquest and oppression.

Though Eisenhower modified the previous administration’s rhetorical strategies, the die was

clearly cast during the Truman administration.

Of primary importance to this paper is the idea that the rhetorical creation known as the

Cold War guided American foreign policy for over 40 years (Cole, 1999; Kane, 1991; Medhurst,
1997; Scott, 1997; Stuckey, 1992, 1995; Wander, 1984/1997). The Cold War, as shaped by

Truman and modified by Eisenhower and the presidents to follow, became a frame of reference
“through which to view, understand and explain all the historical events that occurred during its
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lengthy life span” (Kane, 1991, p. 80). It became a way of interpreting events as well as a

justification and rationale for American foreign policy and action (Scott, 1997; Stuckey, 1992,
1995). As a lens through which to view the world, the Cold War focused on certain acceptable

policies and courses of action while ignoring others. For example, by looking at relations

between the United States and the Soviet Union as in a state of constant political and ideological

warfare, American foreign policy demanded containment rather than appeasement, competition

rather than cooperation (Wander, 1984/1997). There are several ways in which the Cold War
guided American foreign policy.
According to Wander (1984/1997), Cold War rhetoric consisted of three controlling

ideologies. He labels these “prophetic dualism,

technocratic realism,” and “nationalism.”

Wander says that the ideology of prophetic dualism portrays a world in which one side (the

United States) “acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God’s will” (p. 157),
while the other side (the Soviet Union) acts in direct opposition. Thus, everything the United
States did was good and just, while Soviet actions were evil; American moral and spiritual

superiority were official aspects of foreign policy. Wander says that technocratic realism takes a

more humanistic and scientific approach, focusing on American interests rather than on
American values. Under this ideology, negotiation becomes possible, but competition over

scientific, military and economic matters remains of utmost importance. Finally, the ideology of
nationalism, Wander says, personifies nations, portraying the United States as the embodiment

of truth justice and freedom and the Soviet Union as the embodiment of opposite qualities.
These ideologies are capable of existing simultaneously, even occurring within the same speech.

The point is that Cold War rhetoric promoted these ideologies, thus limiting discourse and
foreign policy to particular aspects of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet

1
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Union (Wander, 1984/1997).

Another way the Cold War influenced United States foreign policy is through metaphor.
The Cold War can be considered a master metaphor — a controlling metaphor that generates
other metaphors (Ivie, 1987, 1997). The Cold War metaphor, Ivie (1997) says, equated Soviets

with “barbarians,” portrayed freedom as “fragile,” and proclaimed the “price of freedom” to be
high. These metaphors translated to motives for foreign policy and action (Ivie, 1987, 1997);
military action in particular was justified because of the need to protect our “fragile freedom”
against the “savage” enemy. Motives for policy and action come from metaphor, and metaphor

points to motive (Ivie, 1987, 1997). Thus, by analyzing the metaphors used in Cold War
rhetoric, Ivie (1997) says, we can understand the motives for policy and action.

The Cold War, in addition to generating metaphors, generated myths which helped to

guide foreign policy. Several myths arising from Cold War rhetoric, according to Klope (1986),
are the myths of progress (which America strives to achieve and the Soviets seek to stifle),

freedom (in which America plays the protector and the Soviet Union the destroyer), mission
(America’s mission is to protect the world against communism), and self-interest (in which it is

in our best interest to promote democracy and stop the spread of communism around the world).
Klope (1986) says that Reagan, for example, used the myths of progress, freedom, mission, and
national self-interest to shift blame for the invasion of Grenada from the United States to the
Soviet Union. He points out that myths function to signify beliefs held in common by large

groups of people and that they give meaning to events.
Whether through ideology, metaphor, or myth, the Cold War served to define many

ambiguous situations (Klope, 1986; Ivie, 1997; Scott, 1997). It helped to define the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union for over 40 years. The rhetoric of the Cold War
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limited debate and defined discourse in such a way as to limit foreign policy options (Cole,
1999; Hollihan, 1986; Ivie, 1987; Kane, 1991; Medhurst, 1997; Parry-Giles, 1994; Scott, 1997;

Stuckey, 1995; Wander, 1984/1997).

Summary of the Literature
As we have seen, the rhetorical presidency arose out of changes in leadership, the mass
media and campaign styles and led to the public perception that words, rather than actions,
constitute leadership. The rhetorical presidency created a climate in which presidents can appeal
directly to the public in order to generate support for policies and actions. Presidents have used

this ability to usurp powers of war from Congress to the degree that they can order armed forces

into combat, then explain their actions to the public and gain the support of the people and the
legislative branch. Crisis rhetoric is the term scholars typically give to presidential rhetoric that
serves to define the importance of particular policies or recommend courses of action —
including military action — in situations deemed critical. And until the presidency of George
Bush, the Cold War served as the dominant paradigm of crisis rhetoric. The Cold War and the

types of arguments it generated served to justify the use of military force in times of international
crisis. The question undertaken by this study is this: now that the Cold War is over, how has the

crisis rhetoric of presidents changed?
As Bill Clinton’s presidency comes to an end, scholars will no doubt begin to examine

his rhetoric. Research thus far has examined Clinton’s leadership style (Greenstein, 1995;
Wendt & Fairhurst, 1994), his use of rhetorical invention (Murphy, 1997), the political
orientation of his rhetoric (Brenders & Fabj, 1993), his level of cognitive complexity (Suedfeld,

1994), his anti-drug rhetoric (Gordon, 1994), and media coverage of the president (Heuvel, 1994;
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Meyers, 1994; Miller & Pavlik, 1994; Owen, 1997). However, as of yet, little has been done to

determine how Clinton’s discourse fits into the literature of crisis rhetoric and how his rhetoric
differs from that of the Cold War presidents. Two studies bear mention at this point. Stuckey
(1995) examined the rhetoric of George Bush and Bill Clinton and says that foreign policy
events are now interpreted individually rather than as a part of a larger pattern. She says that this

has made crisis rhetoric less persuasive. Cole (1999) says that no policy has yet replaced
containment as the rationale for why the United States should resort to military force. In
comparing the rhetoric of Bush and Clinton concerning military involvement in Bosnia, Cole
says Bush continued to center on Cold War themes after the Cold War ended while Clinton

essentially abandoned them. According to these studies, the end of the Cold War has left
presidents searching for new justifications for military action. This study will show that

President Clinton has found a new overriding theme that justifies military action in the post-Cold
War world while still relying on the old themes established by his predecessors.

Purposes and Objectives

The purpose of this study was to determine how presidential crisis rhetoric justifying the

use of military action has changed since the end of the Cold War. In the past, presidents drew on
the Cold War paradigm as justification for using military force around the world. As we have
seen, the Cold War paradigm generated specific ideologies, metaphors and myths. These

became ways of interpreting world events as well as arguments that justified presidential policies
and actions during times of international crisis. Several scholars have pointed out that since the
Cold War is over, presidents will necessarily search for new arguments to justify their use of
military force (Cole, 1999; Kane, 1991; Stuckey, 1995). A new rhetoric will be created to

replace the rhetoric that drew so much from the Cold War representation of the world. The

MH
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purpose of this study was to determine what, if any, paradigm has replaced the Cold War as the
justification for international military involvement. Are crisis situations interpreted individually,

as Stuckey (1995) suggests, or is there a larger pattern that has replaced the patterns of discourse
generated by the Cold War view of the world? Answering this question was the primary concern

of this study.
Methodology

In order to determine exactly how presidential crisis rhetoric has changed since the end

of the Cold War, I have analyzed speeches by President Bill Clinton announcing military action

to the American public. Although the exact date marking the end of the Cold War has been
disputed, it is generally accepted that the Cold War ended under the watch of George Bush
around the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the

election of non-communist governments in Eastern Europe (LaFeber, 1994). Therefore, Bill
Clinton is the first president to be elected in the post-Cold War world. For this reason I have

concentrated solely on the rhetoric of Bill Clinton.
Texts

In order to determine how Bill Clinton justifies military action, I analyzed all televised
speeches given by Bill Clinton announcing the use of military force. I chose to focus only on

televised speeches for several reasons. First, television is the most accessible medium for most
Americans and is generally the medium of choice for presidents seeking to communicate with
the public regarding urgent situations (Dow, 1989). As we have seen, one of the goals of crisis

rhetoric is to obtain Congressional support for military action by generating a favorable public
opinion. The most effective way for presidents to reach the largest population possible is
through television. Thus, presidents can be reasonably expected to use their strongest arguments
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when addressing a television audience. Since this study is concerned with the arguments

■

advanced in crisis rhetoric, it seems prudent to look at the speeches in which President Clinton
presents his strongest case for each “crisis” situation. Television represents the greatest use of

the presidential power to persuade since it reaches the largest audience. While Clinton could be
expected to provide a rationale for military involvement in situations other than televised
speeches — such as radio addresses, commencement addresses, political fundraisers, etc. — these
speeches are not directly witnessed by the American public at large and often only mention the

use of military force briefly.
Clinton has ordered the use of military force on several occasions. On June 26, 1993, he

ordered U. S. forces to fire cruise missiles at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad as

retaliation for what the Central Intelligence Agency described as a plot to assassinate former
president George Bush (Weiner, 1993). Clinton addressed the nation later that evening to
announce this attack.

On October 7, 1993, Clinton announced to the nation that he would send over 15,000

troops into the African nation of Somalia; these troops would support the 4,700 sent in as part of
a United Nations force by president George Bush ten months earlier. Although this particular
use of military force could be interpreted as a continuation of a previous action, Clinton made it
clear that events had taken a turn for the worse and that the new situation constituted a crisis

which did not previously exist — 14 Americans had been killed in recent outbreaks of violence
(Jehl, 1993). Therefore, this address constitutes an example of crisis rhetoric as defined earlier.

A third speech announcing military action came on September 15, 1994. Clinton

announced to the nation that he was sending troops into Haiti in order to restore its democratic
government (Apple, 1994). Haiti’s president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, had been ousted by Haiti’s

fl
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military, led by General Raoul Cedras, and Clinton presented the use of military force as the
final solution to ending the atrocities committed by the Cedras regime (Jehl, 1994).

In October of 1994, Iraq began massing forces along the Kuwaiti border. On October 10,
1994, Clinton ordered aircraft carriers and warplanes to be sent to the Persian Gulf to “defend

Kuwait” from Iraqi aggression (Gordon, 1994, p. Al). Later that evening he announced this

action to the nation in a televised speech.

By the end of 1995, violence and civil war had been raging in Bosnia for nearly three and
a half years. Interpreting this violence as a threat to European security, NATO forces, led by the

United States, made the decision to intervene militarily (Mitchell, 1995). On November 27,

1995, Clinton announced to the American public that 20,000 United States troops would be sent
to Bosnia as part of a peace-keeping force (Mitchell, 1995).
On August 20, 1998, Clinton delivered his sixth televised speech announcing military

action in foreign lands. Earlier that month, terrorists had bombed two U. S. Embassies in Africa;
United States intelligence agencies claimed that Osama bin Laden, a terrorist leader, was
responsible for the attacks (Risen, 1998). Acting on this information, Clinton ordered bombing

attacks on two of bin Laden’s suspected military training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan, then
announced the action to the public later that day (Risen, 1998).

In December of 1998, tensions once more arose between the United States and Iraq. Iraq
had refused to allow United Nations investigators to search suspected chemical weapons labs.

After warning Iraq of impending military action if it did not comply with inspectors, Clinton
ordered air strikes on Baghdad on December 16 (Clines & Myers, 1998). Later that evening, he

announced this action in a televised speech.

1
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Clinton’s eighth speech to the nation announcing military intervention came on March
24, 1999. Like the military intervention in Bosnia, this action was undertaken in conjunction

with NATO; Serbian forces, led by Slobodan Milosevic, stood accused of military aggression
and genocide in the region of Kosovo, which, according to NATO, threatened to spill over into
other European nations (Clines, 1999). NATO and United States forces began air attacks against

Serbia on March 24, and Clinton addressed the nation once again.
In summary, the specific speeches that were analyzed were Clinton’s address to the
nation on Iraq, televised June 26, 1993; his address to the nation on military involvement in
Somalia, televised October 7, 1993; his address to the nation on moving ground troops into Haiti,
televised September 15, 1994; his address to the nation on sending military forces to the Persian

Gulf, televised October 10, 1994; his address to the nation on sending a peace-keeping force to
Bosnia, televised November 27, 1995; his address to the nation on retaliation against terrorists in

Sudan, televised August 20, 1998; his address to the nation concerning the bombing of Iraq on
December 16, 1998; and his address to the nation concerning air strikes against Serbia, televised
March 24, 1999. Texts of the first five speeches were obtained from the Public Papers of the

Presidents, while the three most recent texts were obtained via the White House web site. These
speeches represent all televised addresses given by President Clinton justifying the use of

military force in crisis situations.

Method of Analysis
The goal of this study was to determine what, if any, worldview has come to replace the
Cold War as justification for military intervention. In order to achieve this goal I have analyzed

the arguments presented by Bill Clinton that justify military action. As we have seen, the Cold
War generated arguments for the use of military force in several ways. It was a controlling
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worldview that generated ideologies and metaphors that served as arguments justifying
presidential action in crisis situations.

Stuckey (1995) says that metaphors order political realities and that a dramatistic

perspective is useful for revealing relationships between rhetorical acts and societal values.

1

I

Hollihan (1986) says that in addition to the Cold War, the New World Order and Power Politics

dramas are important paradigms that can help us to understand foreign policy. The Cold War
drama, Hollihan (1986) says, revolves around Wander’s (1984/1997) prophetic dualism, while

the New World Order drama rejects the idea of pure good versus pure evil (Hollihan, 1986;

Stuckey, 1995). The New World Order drama posits that potentially equal moral actors attempt
to avoid confrontation and work together to see beyond narrow self-interests. Finally, Hollihan’s
(1986) Power Politics drama is based on Wander’s (1984/1997) technocratic realism ideology —

in this drama the nation’s self-interest is the guiding principle of foreign policy. As Campbell

and Jamieson (1990) have pointed out, presidential speeches announcing military action justify
that action through narratives from which arguments are drawn. I therefore analyzed Clinton’s

crisis rhetoric from the perspective of these three dramas (or narratives) in order to determine

what ideological patterns are prevalent in his discourse and what his justifications for military
intervention are.

These dramas also generate metaphors. As Ivie (1987) points out, “metaphors are
routinely elaborated into motivating perspectives” (p. 165-167); by analyzing metaphor, one can

understand a speaker’s motives. An understanding of Clinton’s motives for using the military in

crisis situations will help to illuminate the paradigm from which he draws his arguments. Hart
(1997) says that patterns of metaphorical usage create underlying thematic unity. Thus, it would

appear to be fruitful to look for patterns in Clinton’s use of metaphor that would reveal his
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underlying justifications for military intervention. As discussed previously, the Cold War served

as an orientational metaphor —now that it is over we would benefit from determining if a new
master metaphor has taken its place or if presidential crisis rhetoric is left without a larger frame

of reference. I undertook this study with that specific goal in mind.
This study is designed to add to our understanding of presidential rhetoric by illuminating

ways in which crisis rhetoric has changed (or not changed) since the end of the Cold War. This
will now be done via analysis of the patterns that emerge from Bill Clinton’s speeches

I

i
announcing military intervention. By analyzing these speeches using the dramas outlined and by

searching for metaphors embedded within these dramas, this study will examine whether or not
new themes have arisen to take the place of the Cold War as justification for military

intervention.
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Chapter 2:

The Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War Dramas

Scholars have described three dramas that serve to justify foreign policy and military
action - these are the Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War dramas (Hollihan, 1986;
Stuckey, 1995). I analyzed Clinton’s crisis rhetoric from the perspective of these three dramas in

order to determine what ideological patterns are prevalent in his discourse and what his
justifications for military intervention are. I also looked for meaningful patterns of metaphor
that might be illustrative of Clinton’s justifications for foreign intervention. It is clear from this

analysis that Clinton uses all three of these dramas in his speeches announcing military action,
although the Cold War drama has been significantly altered now that the Cold War itself is over;
it is also clear that several of these dramas (particularly the New World Order drama) rely on the

use of metaphor to be effective. This chapter details that analysis. Perhaps more significantly,
in performing this analysis I discovered a separate drama used by President Clinton as
justification for military intervention. I argue for the recognition of this drama, which I have

labeled the “World’s Policeman” drama, in Chapter 3.
Power Politics and the National Interest

The Power Politics drama, according to Hollihan (1986), is based on the idea of

technocratic realism developed by Wander (1984/1997). In this drama, leaders act in accordance
with what is “best” for America; the nation’s self-interest is the guiding principle of foreign

policy. The Power Politics drama does not rely on moral claims (Stuckey, 1995; Wander,
1984/1997). Rather, it relies on scientific principles of decision making and secular and
humanistic justifications for action (Wander, 1984/1997). The Power Politics drama is not
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rooted in the idea of good versus evil as it finds the modem world “much too complex for old-

time religion” (Wander, 1984/1997, p. 165). The world of the Power Politics drama is one of
“equally self-interested pragmatists” (Stuckey, 1995, p. 217). In other words, technocratic

realism does not stand on principle (as prophetic dualism does) — it stands on the idea of doing

what is technically best for America, with efficiency being stressed over morality (Wander,
1984/1997). Heroes in this drama are those who secure the best position for the United States,

while the villains are those who cause or create problems for the U. S., including open conflict
(Stuckey, 1995). The objective of foreign policy is to secure benefits for the United States, and

when possible, to avoid conflict (Hollihan, 1986). That military action might be justified as a
way of avoiding conflict may seem paradoxical, but as we shall see, present action is often
portrayed as necessary to preventing future problems, including large-scale war.

Clinton relies on the Power Politics drama for justification of military actions, repeatedly

pointing out to the public just how these actions are directly related to American interests. There

are several themes that recur within Clinton’s use of the Power Politics drama — these themes
might also be conceptualized as dimensions of the national interest. One of these dimensions is

national security, or the prevention or ending of conflicts that might affect American lives and
the safety of our very nation. A second theme mixes national security with geographic location,

arguing that certain areas of the world (specifically Central Europe) are more likely to affect
America’s security. A third theme suggests that our economic security is threatened when
conflicts take place close to our borders.
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National Security
Arguments for military involvement based on national security come in two forms: one

defines the actions of another entity (nation, group or individual) as a direct attack against
Americans; the other defines a situation as one that could potentially result in a large-scale war
or future conflict into which America would inevitably be drawn. In both cases military

intervention is justified as a way of securing the best position for the United States while
avoiding future problems.

Direct Attack on Americans. One speech that relies on what I have described as the first

element of national security is Clinton’s first speech concerning Iraq. In this address, he details

a plot by Saddam Hussein to assassinate former President George Bush (1993a). He says that
“the attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans”
(p. 938). Such an act “against our Nation” (p. 938) cannot go unanswered, Clinton says. He says

that for the past 200 years, “America’s security has depended on the clarity of this message:
Don’t tread on us” (p. 938). We cannot allow other nations to threaten our security or the lives
of Americans. Thus, Clinton says, we have launched cruise missile attacks against Iraq. This is
necessary “to protect our sovereignty . . . [and] to deter further violence against our people” (p.

938). Clinton goes on to say that “we will protect our people” (p. 939) and that he personally is
“determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure” (p. 939). The plot by Iraq to

assassinate former President Bush is portrayed by Clinton as a direct attack against an American
— and an important American at that. We cannot allow another nation to assault our citizens,

Clinton is saying, especially when that citizen is a symbol of our very way of life.
Clinton also portrays the situation in Somalia as one in which Americans have been

directly attacked. He first details the situation, in which American troops have been sent to the

Crisis Rhetoric 25
African nation to “end the starvation of the Somali people” (1993b, p. 1703). Troops were
originally sent in as a part of a “United Nations humanitarian mission” (p. 1704) to end this
starvation, which Clinton describes as “one of the great human tragedies of this time” (p. 1704).

Recently, however, these troops have been attacked by “armed Somali gang[s],” who have
“desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot” (p.

1703). Action is called for in this situation in order to protect the troops in Somalia from further
violence. Clinton says he is “determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or

held captive” (p. 1704). To this end, he says he has “ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and
104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and to complete our mission”

(p. 1704). Thus, the purpose of sending additional troops to Somalia is to help protect the troops
who are already there. It is in the nation’s best interest to protect our troops while they finish

their mission.
In Clinton’s speech concerning terrorism, he says that he has ordered American armed
forces to strike terrorist-related facilities “because of the imminent threat they presented to our
national security” (1998a, par. 1). He goes on to say that these terrorists have “killed American,

Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia” and have “planned to bomb six United States

747s over the Pacific” (par. 5). This use of military force is most directly related to the bombing
of two United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where “12 Americans and nearly
300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded” (par. 6). Thus,

the current military action is in direct response to very real threats to American national security

in which American lives have been lost. As Clinton says, there are times “when our very
national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety
of our citizens” (par. 8). He says that with further evidence that Osama bin Laden and his
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terrorist group were “planning to mount further attacks against Americans,” action had to be
taken (par. 8). Under “unanimous recommendation from my national security team,” Clinton
says, “I ordered our Armed Forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the bin

Laden network” (par. 9).

The Threat of Future Conflict. Clinton’s address to the nation concerning the bin Laden
network provides an opportunity to segue into the second element of national security — the

threat of future conflict — as this speech also appeals to this theme. In addition to the immediate
threat of violence against Americans, Clinton says that it is in the United States’ best interest to
act against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group because of the threat that terrorism in
general poses to America. He says that America “is and will remain a target of terrorists” (par.
15) and that despite this, “we will defend our people, our interests and our values” (par. 17).

Clinton summarizes our national interest in fighting terrorism when he says:

Our battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our embassies in
Africa; nor will it end with today’s strike. It will require strength, courage and

endurance. We will not yield to this threat. We will meet it, no matter how long
it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and

fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism. We must be prepared to do all
that we can for as long as we must. (par. 14)
Terrorism threatens the lives of Americans and the national security of the United States.

Clinton argues that military action against bin Laden and his terrorist network is justified

because of this. If we did not act, Clinton says, we would be open to further attacks, for inaction
“would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact” (par.

17). It is in America’s best interest, Clinton suggests, to take military action against Osama bin
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Laden as well as to take action against future terrorist threats to the United States. The current
I

bombing is portrayed as a reaction to a very real assault against Americans as well as a deterrent

against future terrorist actions
Other addresses focus on this second element of national security as well, including

Clinton’s second and third speeches concerning Iraq. In his second address on Iraq, Clinton

announces the movement of troops to the Persian Gulf in response to Saddam Hussein’s massing
of the Iraqi army along the Kuwaiti border (1994b). Clinton says that “three and a half years

ago, the men and women of our Armed Forces . . . fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to
protect our interests in that vital region” (p. 1726). Clinton does not say exactly what those

interests were, but he goes on to say:

In 1990, Saddam Hussein assembled a force on the border of Kuwait and then

invaded. Last week, he moved another force toward the same border. Because of
what happened in 1990, this provocation requires a strong response from the

United States and the international community, (p. 1726)
Thus, we must act now to prevent what happened in 1990 from happening again — it is in our

national interest to avoid another Gulf War. As Clinton says, our troops who are now en route to
the Gulf region are “protecting our security” (p. 1726).

Clinton’s third speech on Iraq involves the announcement of air strikes. Clinton opens
the address by stating that our military’s purpose “is to protect the national interest of the United
States and, indeed, the interest of people throughout the Middle East and around the world”

(1998b, par. 1). Specifically, it is in our national interest that Hussein “not be allowed to

threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons” (par.

1). Clinton then goes on to detail how United Nations weapons inspectors have been expelled

i
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from Iraq without being able to do their job of verifying whether it is complying with provisions

of the Gulf War treaty that forbid it from developing weapons of mass destruction. As Clinton
says, “the inspectors undertook this mission ... at the end of the Gulf War, when Iraq agreed to

-

declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the cease-fire” (par. 3). The reason for this ban
=

on weapons of mass destruction is that Hussein “has used them, not once but repeatedly —

unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops . . . not only against soldiers, but against

civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iran” (par. 4).

Therefore, it is in our national interest to force Iraq to comply with weapons inspectors so that
Hussein does not use these weapons again; much like his second speech concerning Iraq, this

speech suggests that by acting with military force now, we can avoid costlier confrontations in

the future. It is in our national interest to use military force today in order to avoid a full-scale
war some time later. In Clinton’s words, “the United States has proven that, although we are

never eager to use force, when we must act in America’s vital interests, we will do so” (par. 33).
These examples clearly illustrate the arguments for national security put forward within

the context of the Power Politics drama. Several justify military action because of real attacks
against American citizens, while others justify this action as a way of preventing conflict in the
future.1

National Security/Geographic Location
The addresses mentioned above rely almost exclusively on security arguments for
military intervention. In several speeches, however, Clinton augments the “potential for future
conflict” argument with arguments that describe the geographic location of current conflicts as

particularly troublesome. Because of the location of these problems, he argues, our security (and
therefore our best interest) is jeopardized even further.

s
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For example, military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is described as beneficial to
our national interest because the potential for war is made greater by its location within Central

Europe. Clinton says that by sending troops to the region to implement the peace agreement, we
will help to “bring stability to Central Europe, a region of the world that is vital to our national
interests” (1995, p. 1784). The conflict in Bosnia is important to our national interests, Clinton

says, because “problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems within

them” (p. 1784). These problems include “the organized forces of intolerance and destruction;
terrorism; ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries” (p. 1784). These forces “threaten freedom
and democracy, peace and prosperity” and therefore “demand American leadership” (p. 1784).

This leadership is called for in Bosnia, where “for nearly 4 years a terrible war has tom [the area]

apart” (p. 1784-1785). As Clinton says,
Nowhere has the argument for our leadership been more clearly justified than in
the struggle to stop or prevent war and civil violence. From Iraq to Haiti, from

South Africa to Korea, from the Middle East to Northern Ireland, we have stood

up for peace and freedom because it’s in our interest to do so and because it is the
right thing to do. (p. 1784).

It is in our national interest, Clinton says, to prevent wars when possible. We cannot stop every
war, but we can stop some. As he puts it, “my duty as President is to match the demands for

American leadership to our strategic interest and to our ability to make a difference” (p. 1784).
Bosnia is one such case, where “our interests and values demand” that we act (p. 1787). It is a
place where “we can defend our fundamental values as a people and serve our most basic,

strategic interests” (p. 1784).
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These interests include “securing a free and stable Europe” (p. 1785). Clinton says that it

is in our best interest to
build a peace and stop the suffering. Securing peace in Bosnia will also help to
build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia lies at the very heart of Europe, next-door

to many of its fragile new democracies and some of our closest allies.
Generations of Americans have understood that Europe’s freedom and Europe’s

stability is [sic] vital to our own national security. That’s why we fought two
wars in Europe. That’s why we created NATO and waged the cold war. And

that’s why we must help the nations of Europe to end their worst nightmare since
World War II, now. (p. 1785)

It is in our national interest to help bring peace to Bosnia for several reasons. Bosnia is near
several democracies that are our allies, and it is therefore in our interest to protect those allies.

More importantly, instability in Europe caused two World Wars; if we act now, Clinton suggests,
we can avoid a third. This argument powerfully portrays our need to get involved, for it suggests
that if we do not act now, things could get out of hand and America could eventually be drawn

into an even larger conflict. The reference to the Cold War is also important. It serves as a
reminder to Americans of what can happen if democracies are not allowed to peacefully flourish.
Thus, in his speech on Bosnia, Clinton portrays military action as essential because of the threat

to our national security; this threat is increased because Bosnia is located near several of our
“closest allies” and is in an area central to World Wars I and II. Clinton implies that the
geographic location of Central Europe is one of historic instability, and therefore one more likely

to see large-scale conflicts.
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Clinton returns to the idea that intervention in Europe is in America’s best interest when
he announces the bombing of Serbia. “We act to prevent a wider war,” he says, “to diffuse a

powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with

catastrophic results” (1999, par. 2). He specifically refers to “protecting our interests” (par. 2),
“America’s national interest” (par. 8), “dangers to . . . our national interests” (par. 17), and
dealing with “problems such as this before they do permanent harm to our national interests”

(par. 21). The problem Clinton refers to is the ethnic warfare perpetrated by the Serbians against
the people of Kosovo. Clinton says that Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, has “stripped

Kosovo of [its] constitutional autonomy” and “sent. .. troops and police to crush them” when

they have peacefully resisted (par. 4). Serbians have “started moving from village to village,
shelling civilians and torching their houses” (par. 7). This violence is described by Clinton as

“an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people” (par. 7). This problem affects
America’s national interest because

Kosovo . . . sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East,
at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of
Christianity. To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new

1 democratic allies in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small
countries . . . that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from
Kosovo, (par. 8)

In other words, there is a great possibility that this war will spread if it is not stopped, largely
because of the delicate nature of Central Europe.
Clinton furthers this argument when he says that this very region is where World War I

started and that the “Holocaust engulfed this region” (par. 9). He says that
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In both wars Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States
waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had

acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many
. Americans would not have had to die. (par. 9)
Though perceptive audience members might question the validity of this comparison made in
perfect hindsight, it serves to show how conflicts such as the one in Kosovo can spread if they
are not stopped. Thus, it is in the United States’ best interest to intervene now in order to avoid

becoming involved in a larger war later on. As Clinton says, “we have acted now .. . because
we have an interest in avoiding an even cruder and costlier war” (par. 24). Thus, this military

action serves America’s national interest.

Clinton’s speeches on Bosnia and Kosovo both rely on arguments designed to gain
support by detailing how current situations could result in larger wars in the future. These
arguments are bolstered by the geographic location of these regions: because Bosnia and Kosovo
are located in Central Europe, they are less stable and any conflicts that spill outside their
borders will create large problems that could potentially result in full-scale wars involving many
nations, including the United States.

Economic Security/Geographic Location
Military intervention in Haiti is portrayed a bit differently as it takes place very close to

American borders. Clinton begins his speech on Haiti by stating that “the United States must
protect our interests” (1994a, p. 1558). Specifically, we need to “secure our borders, and ...

preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere” (p. 1558). Clinton goes on to say:
I want the American people to understand the background of the situation in

Haiti, how what has happened there affects our national security interests and
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why I believe we must act now. Nearly 200 years ago, the Haitian people rose up

out of slavery and declared their independence. Unfortunately, the promise of
liberty was quickly snuffed our, and ever since, Haiti has known more suffering

■ and repression than freedom. In our time, as democracy has spread throughout

our hemisphere, Haiti has been left behind, (p. 1558)
It is in our best interest, Clinton says, to help Haiti to become free and democratic. He goes on

to say that four years ago, “the Haitian people held the first free and fair elections since their
independence” (p. 1558). This election, however, was overturned by General Raoul Cedras in a

military coup. Since this time, Haitians have been “beaten and murdered” and intimidated with
“a horrible . . . campaign of rape, torture, and mutilation” (p. 1558). People “starved; children

died; thousands of Haitians fled their country, heading to the United States across dangerous
seas” (p. 1558). The coup and dictatorship of Cedras has resulted in people being brutally

mistreated, and in terms of our own national interest, has resulted in a flood of refugees heading
to America. Clinton quotes former President Bush, who reportedly described the situation as
“‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the

United States’” (p. 1558). Thus, Clinton’s claim that the situation in Haiti affects our national
interest is bolstered by his citing of Bush —not one, but two presidents have determined that this

case affects our national interest.
Clinton elaborates on this argument by saying that “when brutality occurs close to our

shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act” (p. 1559). He says
that
This year, in less than 2 months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea

by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today, more than 14,000 refugees are living at our
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naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already expended almost
$200 million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo. And the

prospect of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite

i period of time loom ahead unless we act. (p. 1559)

This argument portrays our national interest in human as well as financial terms; unless we want
a flood of refugees in our nation at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars more in aid, we

must act to restore Haiti’s democratically elected government. As Clinton says, “preserving
democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity” (p. 1559).
And in this case, he says, “our own interests are plain” (p. 1560). Military intervention in Haiti

will “protect our national security interests” (p. 1560). These security interests appear to be
largely economic in nature. We must preserve Democracy within our hemisphere while

protecting our borders, Clinton says, not because nearby nations pose a direct threat to our

security per se, but because conflicts in our part of the world ultimately affect our economic
well-being. We must preserve democracies in the Western hemisphere because they benefit our

economy and because the refugees who flee conflict-engulfed nations often head to America,
costing taxpayers large amounts of money.

Summary
Clinton uses the Power Politics drama to varying degrees in each of his speeches
announcing military action in crisis situations. He directly references America’s “national

interest(s)” and details specific ways that crisis situations threaten the United States directly.

Several dimensions of the national interest can be identified in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric — these
include national security, geographic and economic dimensions. The security dimension is seen

in arguments that describe direct assaults on Americans as well as the threat of future conflicts
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that might involve the loss of many lives. These arguments are often combined with arguments

highlighting the geographic dimension of our national interest — those areas closer to our borders
or those areas located within “trouble-spots” (namely Central Europe) are more likely to create

threats to America’s national security. Finally, conflicts within our hemisphere threaten our
security economically, thereby combining the geographic and economic elements of our national

interest.
Clinton uses the Power Politics drama as a way of justifying military action. Intervention
is warranted when situations threaten to obstruct America’s ability to keep its citizens safe and to

prosper economically. Within this drama, Clinton is the hero, as he seeks to secure the best
position for the United States, both immediately and in the future. The villains are those, such as

Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, Slobodan Milosevic and Raoul Cedras, who threaten the
acquiring of beneficial positions. These positions include peace and security for Americans as

well as economic prosperity. The Power Politics drama is presented as a way of justifying
military action; however, there are other dramas that Clinton refers to during his addresses

announcing military involvement.
The New World Order: Drama and Metaphor

Unlike the Power Politics drama, the New World Order drama seeks to go beyond narrow
self-interests in order that potentially equal moral actors might avoid confrontation and work

together (Hollihan, 1986; Stuckey, 1995). Conflict can be avoided “if nations learned how to
interact in accordance with high moral standards” (Hollihan, 1986, p. 373). According to the

New World Order drama, then, nations should interact with the good of all in mind. People are
generally characterized as moral and good, and nations should work together to solve problems
without conflict. Thus, Hollihan points out, “heroes” in the New World Order drama are those

1
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who are willing to see beyond narrow self-interests to make “humane and moral decisions,”

while “villains” are those who are not (p. 374). Like the Cold War drama, the New World Order

drama relies on moral claims. However, it portrays other nations as potential equals, and so
American foreign policy is not always a case of America being right while our enemies are

wrong. This is a much “more complicated moral universe” in which the United States is
“challenged to prove its morality” by doing what is right and just for all nations involved

(Stuckey, 1995, p. 216).

Clinton uses the New World Order drama within his addresses announcing military
action. He uses this drama not only by suggesting that American intervention goes beyond

narrow self-interests, but by relying on the metaphor of the “community of nations.” He also

uses the international organizations of the United Nations and NATO to argue that American
military action is taken for the good of all involved, rather than for the sole gain of the United

States. It might seem that the Power Politics drama and the New World Order drama are
incompatible, since the Power Politics drama relies on America’s best interests alone, but as we
will see, Clinton uses both as justifications for military intervention.

The Community of Nations
Clinton develops the New World Order drama by referring to the “community of

nations,” the “international community” and the “neighborhood.” These references serve to

underscore the idea that all nations are potentially moral equals who must work toward a

common good; the actions of one affect all others. At times, Clinton specifically mentions the
“community of nations,” but at other times, his references to the international community are

more indirect, relying on the suggestion that there are many nations, not just the United States,
who have a stake in the given military action. And, in many instances, Clinton portrays an

i
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enemy” or “villain” as one who has refused to cooperate with the high moral standards of this
community.

In his first address to the nation announcing military action (concerning the alleged plot
of Iraq to assassinate former President Bush), Clinton says that Saddam Hussein has “repeatedly
violated the will and conscience of the international community” (1993a, p. 938). This latest

action has resulted in the bombing of Iraq, which Clinton says is designed to “affirm the
expectation of civilized behavior among nations” (p. 938). The irony of this statement is

interesting; Clinton is saying that America has bombed Iraq in order to make it behave more
peacefully. Finally, he says that “the world has repeatedly made clear what Iraq must do to
return to the community of nations. And Iraq has repeatedly refused” (p. 939). The
“community of nations” theme is present, as is the idea of all nations involved acting with high

moral standards — Iraq has violated these standards and must be brought in line with the rest of

the world.
In Clinton’s second address concerning Iraq, he says that “the United States and the

international community have given their word that Iraq must respect the borders of its
neighbors” (1994b, p. 1726). Iraq has violated this respect through “troop movements and
threatening statements” toward Kuwait (p. 1726). Clinton says that “because of what happened
in 1990 [the Gulf War], this provocation requires a strong response from the United States and

the international community” (p. 1726). Furthermore, he says that “we will not allow Saddam

Hussein to defy the will of the United States and the international community” (p. 1726). Iraq
will not be allowed to “threaten its neighbors” (p. 1726). Thus, troops are being sent to the

Persian Gulf in order to deter another invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Clinton’s overt references to

the “international community” as well as his use of the “neighborhood” metaphor serve to
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dramatize this use of military action in terms of the New World Order.
Clinton’s third speech on Iraq also relies on mention of the international community and

the metaphor of the neighborhood. He says “the international community had good reason” to
demand inspection of Iraq’s potential weapons facilities considering its past record of using such

weapons (1998b, par. 4), and that “the international community had little doubt” that such
weapons would be used against others (par. 5). He also points out that “the international

community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation” (par. 17), and should Iraq be

allowed to get away with its defiance of the weapons inspectors, Hussein “would conclude that
the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will” (par. 20). Finally,

Clinton says that “so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international

community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions” (par. 28). Hussein and Iraq are
portrayed as the villains in this drama because they refuse to cooperate with the rest of the world

and are not acting in accordance with what is good for all involved (i.e., peacefully).
Clinton relies on the neighborhood metaphor when he states that “Saddam Hussein must
not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological

weapons” (1998b, par. 1). Thus, Clinton has “ordered America’s armed forces to strike military
and security targets in Iraq” (par. 1). And the United States must be ready to use force in the
future should Hussein continue “threatening his neighbors” (par. 27). If we do not, Clinton

warns, “Saddam will strike again at his neighbors” (par. 32). By using the word “neighbor” in

this way, Clinton further solidifies the idea of the community of nations that must work together

rather than in each nation’s narrow self-interest — a key tenet of the New World Order drama.
Finally, in his third speech on Iraq, Clinton uses several other strategies to show that the

military action being taken is in the best interest of all involved. He says the purpose of
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American and British military units is to “protect. . . the interest of people throughout the
Middle East and around the world” (par. 1). Not only is the United States looking beyond its

own narrow self-interests, it is working with Great Britain under the authority of the United

Nations (as detailed above). In another, perhaps more interesting argument, Clinton seeks to

justify the timing of the air strikes, which occurred the day before the House of Representatives
was scheduled to vote on whether to impeach him:

The Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate
military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim

world, and therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the
progress we have made in the Middle East. That is something we wanted very

much to avoid .... (par. 24)
Clinton bolsters this statement with other arguments designed to support the timing of the
attacks. He says that “in the judgement of my military advisors, a swift response would provide

the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare” by “protectfing] his weapons”
(par. 23). He also says that “our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain,

concurred that now is the time to strike” (par. 25). Perhaps this line of argument is designed to

deflect criticism that the strikes against Iraq might be intended to delay the House vote —

criticisms which did occur (see, for example, Apple, 1998; Mitchell, 1998; Schmitt, 1998). One
cannot tell for sure. It is apparent, however, that in no other speech does Clinton seek to justify

the timing of military action in this way. In every speech he is careful to justify the action itself,

but this speech is unique in its justification of the precise timing of the action. Within the
current framework, however, it is most useful to point out that these arguments make sense

within the New World Order drama — Clinton says we must act immediately in order to do what

Crisis Rhetoric 40

is best for all involved, including Muslims, Arabs, the British and Americans.
Clinton’s speech on the bombing of terrorist facilities makes use of the New World Order
drama as well. Clinton outlines the ways in which the terrorist groups in question have
threatened, and continue to threaten, the international community, not just the United States. He
says that these terrorists have

killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to
assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six
United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in

Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt. (1998a, par. 5)
These terrorists have most recently bombed two American embassies in which “12 Americans

and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost there lives” (par. 6). There is “compelling evidence
that the bin Laden network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against

Americans and other freedom-loving people” (par. 8). These terrorists are therefore a threat to
all civilized people, not just Americans. And so America must act.

Within this speech, Clinton takes the time to illustrate the ways in which this action
benefits the entire world, particularly those who might interpret American bombings as

threatening actions. He appeals to Muslims around the world when he says “I want the world to
understand, that our actions today were not aimed against Islam, the faith of hundreds of
millions of good, peace-loving people all around the world” (1998a, par. 13). These actions, he

says, “were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness; and in

so doing, profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act” (par. 13). These actions
are not aimed at Muslims, Clinton is saying. They are aimed at terrorists who commit horrible

acts in the name of Islam; American military action is not harmful to Muslims but is helpful in
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that it shows the world that bin Laden and his terrorist group for what they are — evildoers who

falsely profess to be true believers in what is a peaceful and good religion.

Clinton also mentions Afghanistan and Sudan, where the bombings took place.
“Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these

terrorist groups,” he says (par. 11). “But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right

to be safe havens” (par. 11). These two nations have not lived up to the high moral standards

demanded by the New World Order and thus are villains within this drama. Clinton sums up his
New World Order argument when he says:

I want to reiterate: The United States wants peace, not conflict. We want to lift
lives around the world, not take them. We have worked for peace — in Bosnia, in

Northern Ireland, in Haiti, in the Middle East and elsewhere. But in this day, no
campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism, (par.
17)

Terrorism threatens the very fabric of the New World Order in that random acts of violence
threaten all nations. There cannot be true world peace with groups like the bin Laden terrorist

network operating to undermine the efforts of peace-loving people. Clinton mentions specific

places in which America has worked for peace in order to relate terrorism to the overall theme of
“working for the good of all.” America has championed peace, he says, while terrorists have

tried to undermine our efforts. Those terrorists are clearly the villains in the New World Order

drama while the United States, which seeks to do what is best for all involved, is the hero.
The United Nations and NATO — Symbols of the New World Order

In addition to the idea of the community of nations as a neighborhood in which each

neighbor or state must work for the good of all, Clinton uses the United Nations and NATO as
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symbols of the New World Order. Both organizations consist of nations from different parts of

the world, and as such, references to them create an implicit understanding that these

organizations exist in order to further the interests of all nations involved. Thus, the United
Nations is a symbol of world cooperation (as the name itself suggests), and NATO is a symbol of
the cooperation of the North Atlantic nations (specifically the United States, Canada and

Western Europe). Both the United Nations and NATO are symbolic of the community of
nations (although the U. N. “neighborhood” is much larger), and Clinton’s references to these

organizations further the New World Order drama. Functionally, the United Nations and NATO
are quite similar within Clinton’s speeches. The primary difference is in the geographic location

of the conflict in question. NATO is referred to, not surprisingly, when Clinton speaks about

Bosnia and Kosovo, which are located within Europe. The United Nations is used as a symbol
of the community of nations when conflicts occur in other parts of the world, including Iraq,
Haiti and Somalia.

In his third speech concerning Iraq, Clinton reminds the audience that the weapons

inspectors who have been expelled from Iraq work for the United Nations, rather than the United
States, when he says:
Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate
with the United Nations weapons inspectors, called UNSCOM. They are highly

professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the
elimination of Iraq’s capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass
destruction .... The inspectors undertook this mission ... at the end of the Gulf
War, when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the

cease-fire. (1998b, par. 3)

=
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The United Nations has been defied by Iraq’s actions; Iraq has gone back on an agreement which
was made to end the Gulf War, and as such is threatening the safety of the community of nations.
Clinton says

■ the U. N. Security Council voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam’s actions and to
demand that he immediately come into compliance. Eight Arab nations .. .

warned that Iraq alone would bear the responsibility for the consequences of
defying the U. N. (par. 6)

Iraq later “pledged to the U. N.” (par. 7) that it would comply with UNSCOM, but “failed to

cooperate” (par. 11): Iraq has “blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites” (par. 12),
“restricted UNSCOM’s ability to obtain . . . evidence” (par. 13), and “obstructed UNSCOM’s
effort to photograph bombs” (par. 13). Clinton says he hopes Iraq will “comply with the relevant
U. N. Security Council resolutions,” but that we “have to be prepared that he [Hussein] will not”

(par. 26). Through these statements, Clinton portrays the United Nations as the governing body

of the community of nations — the U. N. determines what behaviors are acceptable to the
community of nations and UNSCOM ensures that these behaviors are followed. These
statements also serve to further isolate Iraq from the community of nations; by defying the U. N.

and UNSCOM, Iraq has separated itself from its immediate neighbors (the Arab world) as well

as the larger world community.

In his speech on Haiti, Clinton says that “the United Nations, the Organization of
American States, the Caribbean community, the six Central American Presidents all have sought
a peaceful end to this crisis” (1994a, p. 1559). Since General Raoul Cedras has refused to
cooperate by returning power to the rightfully elected leader of Haiti, Father Jean-Bertrand

Aristide, the United States and other nations must take action. Clinton says
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In the face of this continued defiance and with atrocities rising, the United States
has agreed to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United
Nations. More than 20 countries from around the globe, including almost all the

• Caribbean community . . . have all agreed to join us because they think this

problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests, (p. 1559)
The United States, therefore, is not acting out of its own narrow self-interests, but is acting out of
the interests of other nations. Clinton implies that America has reluctantly agreed to help — we

have agreed to lead this fight even though it is in the best interests of many others to do so.

The New World Order drama will not end once American troops have ousted Cedras and
restored democracy to Haiti. Clinton says that after this is done, “the international community,

working together, must provide that economic, humanitarian, and technical assistance necessary
to help the Haitians rebuild” (p. 1560). In doing so, a “much smaller U. S. force will join forces

from other members of the United Nations” (p. 1560). This is an important part of this mission,

in which “the nations of the world stand with us” (p. 1560). By mentioning the United Nations
and other world powers, Clinton reinforces the idea that potentially equal moral actors must do
what is best for all involved.

Clinton’s address on Somalia also relies on the United Nations as a symbol of the

international community. He says that 28,000 American troops were originally sent to Somalia
“as a part of a United Nations humanitarian mission” to end starvation and gang warfare (1993b,
p. 1704). These troops were “reduced ... from 28,000 down to less than 5,000, with other

nations picking up where we left off’ (p. 1704). However, at this time, “the people who caused

much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani, and other troops

who were there just to keep the peace” (p. 1704). So American troops were originally sent to
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Somalia as part of a United Nations force; this force has now come under attack, with American

as well as other soldiers being attacked by “gangs.” Clinton says that the job of these forces is
not to solve all of Somalia’s problems, but that “the United Nations and many African states are

more than willing to help” (p. 1704). Toward that end, more American troops are needed to

keep open and secure the roads, the port, and the lines of communication that are
essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food

and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation
and anarchy do not return, (p. 1705)

It is America’s job to assist the world community, led by the United Nations, in making Somalia
a safer place and in ending starvation in anarchy. Clinton says that we are “taking military steps

to protect our own people and to help the U. N. maintain a secure environment” (p. 1705), and
that eventually, other nations will take our place. “Neighboring African states,” he says, “have

offered to take the lead” in these efforts (p. 1705). We are not acting in our self-interests alone,

but are acting in accordance with what is best for everyone, particularly the Somalis.

Clinton clearly uses references to the United Nations as a part of the New World Order

drama. These references serve to demonstrate that the United States is taking military action,
not simply to further its own self-interests, but to do what is best for the world community.
When these military actions take place in Europe, NATO is the symbolic representation of the

community of nations. Much as the United Nations decides what is morally appropriate

behavior for its member nations, NATO decides what is morally appropriate for its members.
Clinton’s speeches on Bosnia and Serbia repeatedly mention NATO. In his speech on

Bosnia, for example, he reminds listeners that in response to Bosnian Serb violence, “the United
States led NATO’s heavy and continuous air strikes” which helped force the Serbs to consider
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“making peace” (1995, p. 1785). The speech then focuses on the implementation of that peace
agreement, which will be enforced by NATO. Clinton says that “troops from our country and

around the world would go into Bosnia to give them the confidence and support they need to
implement their peace plan” (p. 1785). He says that

the only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the powerful military

alliance of democracies that has guaranteed our security for half a century now.
And as NATO’s leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement, the United
States must be an essential part of the mission. If we’re not there, NATO will not

be there, (p. 1785)
The United States has led NATO throughout the unfolding of events in Bosnia, Clinton says, and
therefore must send our military to enforce this peace agreement. This will be an international

effort that will benefit all involved, he suggests, but it must be led by America. Clinton says that

even now,
NATO is completing its planning for IFOR, an international force for peace in

Bosnia of about 60,000 troops. Already more than 25 other nations, including our
major NATO allies, have pledged to take part. They will contribute about two1 thirds of the total implementation force .... The United States would contribute

the rest.... (p. 1786)

These troops will not be sent to Bosnia in order to achieve the narrow self-interests of the United
States, but will be sent in order to ensure a peace that will benefit all involved. Clinton says that
the international community will help to implement arms control provisions of
the agreement so that future hostilities are less likely and armaments are limited,

while the world community, the United States and others, will also make sure that
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the Bosnian Federation has the means to defend itself.... (p. 1786)

This mission will enable the Bosnian factions (Serbs, Muslims and Croats) to live together in

peace. By undertaking this action, the world community will ensure that its members live up to
high moral standards.

Clinton says that “later this week, the final NATO plan will be submitted to me for
review and approval” (1995, p. 1786), and that “if the NATO plan meets with my approval, I

will immediately send it to Congress and request its support” (p. 1786). This plan is clearly

contingent upon United States — specifically Clinton’s — approval. He also points out that
“American troops will take their orders from the American general who commands NATO” (p.
1786). This is an international effort in the interest of the world community, but the United
States will lead. As Clinton says, “the people of Bosnia, our NATO allies, and people all around

the world are now looking to America for leadership. So let us lead” (p. 1787). This speech is

interesting because in it, Clinton makes use of the New World Order drama through specific
reference to NATO while clearly establishing the prominence of the United States. So this

speech utilizes the benefits of the New World Order drama (the persuasiveness of the “we’re
doing what’s right for everyone” appeal) while clearly pointing out that American troops will

remain under American command. Perhaps this argument is designed to show that America is
not being dragged into another European conflict; America is the leader —not the follower — in
this drama.
In his speech on the bombing of Serbia, Clinton also uses NATO to represent the
international community. He says that NATO has been involved in the effort to bring peace to
the Kosovo region for some time — “our diplomacy, backed by the threat of force from our

NATO Alliance, stopped the fighting for a while” (1999, par. 5). He also says that “with our
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allies and Russia, we proposed a peace agreement to end the fighting for good” (par. 5). This
fighting has not ended, however, and so Clinton says that

on Sunday I sent Ambassador Dick Holbrooke to Serbia to make clear to him

• [President Milosevic] again, on behalf of the United States and our NATO allies,
that he must honor his own commitments and stop his repression, or face military
action. Again he refused, (par. 13)

The Serbs have refused to make peace , so “we and our 18 NATO allies agreed to do what we
said we would do, what we must do to restore the peace” (par. 14). The international

community, as represented by NATO, has been attempting to bring peace to this troubled region,
and Milosevic and the Serbs have refused to live up to the moral standards of the New World
Order. Therefore, they must be dealt with militarily.
Clinton says that if Milosevic realizes that “his present course is self-destructive and

unsustainable .... NATO has agreed to help to implement [the peace agreement] with a peace

keeping force” (par. 16). He reminds the audience that this will be a “mission to keep the peace”
(par. 16) and that “the United States and the other 18 nations of NATO” have pledged to help the

people of Kosovo if they “did the right thing” (par. 18). The “right thing,” of course, is to solve
problems peacefully in a manner that reaches beyond narrow self-interests. Kosovo has agreed

to do so — they have “struggled peacefully to get their rights back” (par. 4) — while Serbia has
not, making the distinction between the heroes and the villains in this drama quite clear.
NATO and the United States are also portrayed as heroes in this drama. Clinton asks the

audience to “imagine what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the
other way, as these people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That would discredit NATO”

(par. 19). NATO and the United States must look beyond their own self-interests in order to do
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what is right for others, namely the people of Kosovo. Clinton further develops this argument by
illustrating what might happen if we do not take action.

Already, this movement [of Kosovar refugees] is threatening the young
■ democracy in Macedonia .... Already, Serbian forces have made forays into

Albania from which Kosovars have drawn support. Albania is a Greek minority.
Let a fire bum here and the flames will spread. Eventually, key U. S. allies could
be drawn into a wider conflict.... (par. 20)

America must get take this military action against Serbia because if we do not, the conflict in
Kosovo will spread, eventually involving many members of the world community. The United
States and NATO are heroes in this drama because they are willing to look beyond their own
sacrifices and do what is right for all involved;
Summary

Clinton uses the New World Order drama in several different ways. He refers to the

“international community,” the “community of nations” and the world “neighborhood” as a way
of referencing the ideals of the New World Order. These ideals posit that nations should work
together for the good of all; those who do so are heroes, those who do not are villains.
Therefore, Clinton and the United States are portrayed as heroes while Saddam Hussein, Raoul
Cedras, Osama bin Laden and Slobodan Milosevic are portrayed as selfish villains. Clinton also

uses the United Nations and NATO as symbols of this “world community.” The very titles

themselves connote a cooperation of nations, but Clinton does not stop there. He shows how the
United Nations and NATO operate with a concern for the good of all involved. Thus, the New
World Order drama serves as justification for military intervention — Clinton has ordered various

military actions in order to serve the best interests of the world community.
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The Cold War Drama and Prophetic Dualism

Though the Cold War is over, Clinton still relies upon themes common to the Cold War
drama. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this drama revolves around Wander’s (1984/1997) idea of

prophetic dualism. This drama contends that the United States is morally superior to its enemies
and that conflicts and military actions are most often cases of right versus wrong. During the
Cold War, Soviet actions could easily be portrayed as evil, while the United States’ were good

and pure, because our enemy was institutionalized and by its nature opposed to our way of life
and our national interests. Our moral superiority demanded that we stand up against the evils of
communism wherever they were present. Now that the Cold War is over, Clinton cannot rely on
simple mention of the “Soviet menace” or communism in order to contrast our righteousness

with our enemy’s villainy. Yet he still uses the idea of prophetic dualism, contrasting the good
of our actions and policies with the evil of other nations and groups who oppose us.

Moral Superiority and Opposition to Forces of Evil

Clinton illustrates the villainy and evil of the United States’ enemies in a variety of ways.
He points out that “armed Somali gangfs have] desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers”

(1993b, p. 1703), soldiers who went to Somalia not to fight, but to “stop one of the great human
tragedies of this time” (1993b, p. 1703) by helping to end starvation and gang warfare. Raoul

Cedras, the dictator of Haiti, who controls “the most violent regime in our hemisphere” (1994a,
p. 1 559), has committed “human rights atrocities” (1994a, p. 1559) and has “conducted a reign
of terror, executing children, raping women, killing priests” (1994a, p. 1559). Haitians have

been “slain and mutilated, with body parts left as warnings to terrify others” and children have
been “forced to watch as their mothers’ faces are slashed with machetes” (1994a, p. 1558).
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Terrorist groups led by Osama bin Laden would become the targets of United States air
strikes in 1998. Clinton describes these groups in a particularly evil way. He says they practice

“a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the
murder of innocents” (1998a, par. 3). These same groups

killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to

assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six
United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in
Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt. (1998a, par. 5)
Anyone who would plan to assassinate the Pope (a symbol of holiness to millions around the

world) and murder innocent civilians must surely be evil. These terrorist groups are described
by Clinton as “fanatics and killers” (1998a, par. 13) who promote evil and are therefore our

enemies.

Saddam Hussein, a recurrent figure in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric (three of the eight

speeches analyzed involve military action against Iraq), is also portrayed in a particularly
heinous fashion. Clinton says that Hussein’s regime has “ruled by atrocity, slaughtered its own
people, invaded two neighbors, attacked others, and engaged in chemical and environmental

warfare” (1993a, p. 938), and that “with his acts of aggression and his weapons of mass

destruction ... he cannot be trusted” (1994b, p. 1726). Hussein will “resort to terrorism or

aggression if left unchecked” (1993a, p. 938) and has demonstrated through his actions that he is
“particularly loathsome and cowardly” (1993a, p. 938). We cannot allow Iraq to “threaten its

neighbors or to intimidate the United Nations” (1994b, p. 1726) or to “rebuild its chemical,

biological, and nuclear weapons programs” (1998b, par. 19) and thereby threaten “the well-being
of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world” (1998b, par. 29).

I
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One of Clinton’s most damning statements about Saddam Hussein is made during his
December 16, 1998 speech on Iraq, in which he states:

Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With

Saddam, there’s one big difference: he has used them, not once but repeatedly —
unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war,

not only against soldiers, but against civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens
of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iran — not only against a foreign enemy, but
even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq. (1998b,

par. 4)

Hussein is painted as an evil, cruel leader intent on wreaking havoc with his military might. He

has no qualms about using weapons that the rest of the world denounces and has even used them
against his own people. A leader who would gas his own civilians and who rules by a policy of

intimidation and brutality must surely be evil.
Another leader that Clinton portrays as a wicked tyrant is Slobodan Milosevic. In
announcing NATO air strikes against Serbia (designed to protect the people of Kosovo from the

Serbian army), Clinton describes Milosevic and his followers as particularly brutal.
They’ve started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching

their houses. We’ve seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to
kneel in the dirt and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their

families, fathers and sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. (1999, par. 7)
Clinton reminds us of what Milosevic is capable of, reflecting on the war in Bosnia several years

earlier where there were

I
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innocent people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by

snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries; a

quarter of a million people killed .... This was genocide in the heart of Europe,
. not in 1945, but in 1995 (par. 10)

Furthermore, Milosevic and the Serbians have refused to honor their own peace agreements;
Clinton says that as Kosovo has agreed to the terms of peace, Serbia has “stationed 40,000 troops
in and around Kosovo in preparation for a major offensive — and in clear violation of the
commitments they had made” (par. 6). Milosevic is described as a genocidal maniac on a par

with Adolph Hitler who cannot be trusted to honor his own agreements.

Clinton’s reference to the war in Bosnia and Milosevic’s involvement there during his
1999 address is especially interesting when one notices that in the 1995 speech announcing
America’s intervention in that conflict, Milosevic is not mentioned by name even once. Indeed,

it is hard to tell exactly who America’s enemy is supposed to be. Clinton says that by

intervening, America will “help stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially children” (p.
1784). He describes the “warring ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims” (1995, p.
1785) who have been involved in horrible acts:

Horrors we prayed had been banished from Europe forever have been seared into

our minds again: skeletal prisoners caged behind barbed-wire fences; women and

girls raped as a tool of war; defenseless men and boys shot down into mass
graves, evoking visions of World War II concentration camps; and endless lines
of refugees marching toward a future of despair, (p. 1785)

Clinton does not explain exactly who is responsible for these acts. He does, however, say that
the United States has helped make peace between “two of the three warring parties, the Muslims
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and the Croats” (p. 1785), and informs us that we have “imposed tough economic sanctions on
Serbia” (p. 1785). Serbian shelling is said to have “once again turned Bosnia’s playgrounds and

market-places into killing fields” (p. 1785) before NATO intervention “convinced the Serbs,
finally^ to start thinking about making peace” (p. 1785). Thus, the three parties have come to
make a peace agreement that the United States must enforce. Serbia is described as the last of

the three ethnic groups to agree to peace, but it is unclear whether Clinton is referring to Serbia
when he mentions the “concentration camps,

refugees” and the murder of innocent women

and children.

Clinton’s speech on Bosnia is unique. Though the enemy is not as clearly defined as in
other crisis situations, the United States is still portrayed as on the side of right, opposing wrongs
that exist in the world — an essential tenet of the prophetic dualism model. We oppose the

killing of innocent people and support peaceful solutions to conflicts whenever possible. We are
committed to peace and are therefore opposed to war, although, ironically, we will use warlike

methods to ensure that same peace. Prophetic dualism works by setting up two opposing sides —
right versus wrong — and in this case, right versus wrong exists even though our enemy remains
ambiguous. In a way, one might say that our enemy in this case is war itself — or chaos and
disorder. (This idea will be discussed in depth a bit later on.)
Extolling the Virtues of America

In addition to describing the evil characteristics of our foes, Clinton calls upon the virtues
of the American way of life so as to persuade Americans that we are intervening for a righteous
cause rather than for some less noble motive. Words such as those detailed thus far serve to

place the United States in a position of moral superiority by virtue of our opposition to those

who practice evil deeds. Clinton further elaborates on this superiority by extolling the virtues of
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the American way of life and American ideas of morality. For example, we must act in Haiti in
order to “promote democracy in our hemisphere” (1994a, p. 1558). Clinton says that by forcing

Haitian dictator Raoul Cedras from power, we can restore the “promise of liberty” that Cedras

and his regime have “snuffed out” (1994a, p. 1558). We are opposed to Osama bin Laden and
are targets of his terrorist activities “because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace,

democracy and basic human values; because we’re the most open society on Earth” (1998a, par.
15). Acting against Serbia with air strikes is described as “a moral imperative” (1999, par. 8)
which will stop the oppression of innocent Kosovars.

Clinton often closes his addresses to the nation with comments about American beliefs

and values. In his address on Somalia (1993b), Clinton says “Let us demonstrate to the world, as

generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they
do the job right” (p. 1705). He then expresses his “thanks and . . . gratitude and . . . profound
sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed in Somalia” (p. 1706). By
doing so, Clinton extols the virtues of hard work and sacrifice, two staples of the American value

system.
In closing his speech on Haiti (1994a), Clinton compares the Haitian people to early

Americans, who
more than 200 years ago took up arms against a tyrant whose forces occupied

their land. But they were a stubborn bunch, a people who fought for their
freedoms and appealed to all those who believed in democracy to help their
cause. And their cries were answered, and a new nation was bom, a nation that

ever since has believed that the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
should be denied to none. (p. 1561)
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By comparing the current situation in Haiti to the situation faced by our founders, Clinton

elevates the struggle of the Haitians to a mythical level. Just as Washington, Franklin, Jefferson
and others fought against tyranny, so to do the Haitians. And the Haitians need our help.

Clinton appeals to our obligation to help Haiti by mentioning that our founders “appealed to all

those who believed in democracy to help their cause” — if we truly believe in democracy, we
must come to the aid of the Haitians. And he says, our founders’ “cries were answered, and a

new nation was bom” —Washington, Franklin and Jefferson couldn’t have created the greatest
nation on earth without help. It would be unacceptable, therefore, to turn our backs on neighbors

who are so much like our revered founding fathers. Our superior moral character demands
action.

In other closing remarks, Clinton refers to our “progress in building a world of greater

security, peace, and democracy” (1994b, p. 1726) and our “responsibility as Americans” to lead
the world (1995, p. 1787). He talks about our armed men and women who are acting “for the
sake of our values and our children’s future” (1999, par. 26). And, in his address on the
bombing of terrorist targets, Clinton says that “we will defend our people, our interests and our

values. We will help people of all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear

and violence” (1998a, par. 17). These comments emphasize American beliefs in world

leadership, democracy and freedom. They also show that we are indeed acting because of our
values, rather than out of the desire for some tangible reward like land or resources (this, of

course, is what motivates our morally inferior enemies). These comments also suggest that we

will help others who share our beliefs.

It should also be noted that Clinton closes all of his speeches with some form of the

phrase “God bless America.” The only two variations are “may God bless the people of the

Crisis Rhetoric 57
United States and the cause of freedom” (1994a, p. 1561), and “may God bless our country”

(1998a, par. 18). With God on our side, we must be right, so these words help show the superior

moral character of Americans. They also serve the important function of legitimizing the idea of
a foreign policy based on morality - when the President of the United States invokes God during

a speech on foreign military intervention, he appeals to and furthers the idea that we are acting in
accordance with God’s will, an important concept in the ideology of prophetic dualism (Wander,

1984/1997).
Conclusions are not the only instances in which Clinton uses appeals to American values.
In other instances, he mentions the Cold War directly as he talks about the superiority of the

American experience. In his speech on Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, Clinton says:
America has embodied an idea that has become the ideal for billions of people

throughout the world. Our Founders said it best: America is about life, liberty,

and the pursuit of happiness. In this century especially, America has done more

than simply stand for these ideals. We have acted on them and sacrificed for

them. Our people fought two World Wars so that freedom could triumph over

tyranny .... We made the commitments that kept the peace, that helped to
spread democracy, that created unparalleled prosperity, and that brought victory
in the Cold War. (1995, p. 1784)

Clinton’s mention of the Cold War is important; indeed, he mentions the Cold War specifically
in five of his speeches announcing military action. A look at the other ways in which Clinton

refers to the Cold War will provide further insight.

In his address on Haiti, Clinton says that “in the Post-Cold war world, we will assure the
security and prosperity of the United States with our military strength, our economic power, our
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constant efforts to promote peace and growth” (1994a, p. 1560). Democracy brings peace,

prosperity and security; we must continue to stand up for democracy, just as we did during the

Cold War, because it is ultimately a superior way of life. As the greatest example of democracy
in the modem world, the United States has a moral obligation to encourage its expansion. This

idea is also present when Clinton refers to the Cold War in his speech on Somalia. He states that
if we do not act to preserve the peace in Somalia, “our leadership in world affairs would be

undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and
freedom in the post-Cold War world” (1993b, p. 1705). Clinton seems to be suggesting that our
leadership role in the world is even greater now that the Cold War is over — as victors of the
Cold War we have an obligation to the causes of freedom and democracy. Clinton endorses our
role in expanding democracy once more as he describes the importance of sending troops back

to the Persian Gulf. He says that these troops are “protecting our security as we work for a post

Cold War world of democracy and prosperity” (1994b, p. 1726).
One major role of the United States in the post-Cold War world, then, has not changed

dramatically. We must still work toward a peaceful democratic world. However, the ideology
espoused by Clinton seems to be wary of declaring the world “safer” than it was 15 years ago.
Take, for example, Clinton’s description of Slobodan Milosevic, “a dictator who has done

nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic
and religious division” (1999, par. 9). Evil still exists in the world, and it is still our job as a
morally superior nation to oppose it. Clinton most clearly states this belief when, in his first

address on Iraq, he says that “while the Cold War has ended, the world is not free of danger”

(1993a, p. 939). He elaborates on this idea in his address on Bosnia when he states that
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We’re all vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance and destruction;
terrorism; ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries; the spread of organized crime

and weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking. Just as surely as fascism
and communism, these forces also threaten freedom and democracy, peace and

prosperity. (1995, p. 1784 —italics mine)
Thus, according to the ideology expressed by Clinton, the Cold War is over and the
Soviet threat has abated, but America still has enemies. One major enemy has been defeated,

but other lesser enemies have sprung up to take its place. These enemies are just as evil — as we
have seen, Clinton spares no words in describing how heinous these new enemies are in contrast

to the moral righteousness of America.
This view of America’s role in the posZ-Cold War world is not too different from that

espoused by our leaders during the Cold War in that the United States must still defend and

promote democracy and the American way of life. However, the Cold War drama does not exist
in the way that it used to. The arguments in support of military action that we have looked at
thus far are based on America’s moral superiority and clearly illustrate Wander’s (1984/1997)
idea of prophetic dualism. However, no mention is made of communism or the Soviet Union
(except to remind listeners that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat). The United States is still
positioned as an agent of good and our enemies as agents of evil, but we are no longer opposed

to the institutionalized evil of communism. The evils faced by the United States have various
faces — dictators, genocidal maniacs, terrorists, etc. — and democracy is certainly portrayed as the

force of righteousness. In this way, morality is still an official part of United States foreign

policy, as it was during the Cold War.
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Scholars have pointed out that the Cold War drama is based on the idea of prophetic

dualism (Hollihan, 1986, Stuckey, 1995). But is prophetic dualism a valid ideology outside of

the Cold War drama? Without the Cold War as an ongoing world event, President Clinton
obviously cannot portray democratic America as a force of righteousness in comparison to the

evils of the communist Soviet Union. It should be clear thus far that Clinton does in fact use the
strategy of comparing the good America to its evil enemies, but our enemy is no longer

institutionalized — each case for military intervention must be made on its own merits. Prophetic
dualism still exists, but the Cold War drama per se is clearly no longer useful as a way of
motivating the public to support military intervention in foreign lands. When Clinton does

mention the Cold War directly, it is primarily to remind Americans that the fundamental values

we “fought” for during the Cold War must still be adhered to. However, when using the concept

of prophetic dualism to illustrate differences between America and its enemies, Clinton must do
so without the trappings of the Cold War. Thus, the ideology of prophetic dualism has in a way

been reborn, or perhaps more appropriately has shed the skin of the Cold War and has continued

on in a different form.

If our primary enemy is no longer the communist way of life, do we have an enemy
common to all of the crisis situations Clinton is responding to? Prophetic dualism requires that

American righteousness be contrasted with the evil of our enemies. In the post-Cold War world,
chaos and instability are those enemies.
The Fight Against Instability

Clinton cannot portray communism as a threat to America in the way that former
presidents have. The Cold War is no longer an overriding theme that influences presidential
crisis rhetoric. However, there is another common theme in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric that is
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worthy of attention. Clinton suggests that instability and disorder are enemies we must defeat in

order to give other people a chance at democracy and in order to make the world a safer place.

No one leader or group or institution is responsible for all of this chaos, but by looking at

Clinton’s references to it, we can see how this is an important part of his crisis rhetoric.
In announcing military action in Somalia, Clinton refers to the “anarchy that. . .

prevailed in that country” (1993b, p. 1703) when American troops were originally sent to the
country one year earlier. This anarchy caused the “agonizing death of starvation” (p. 1703) for
millions of people. By reinforcing these troops now, Clinton says, we will “keep the flow of

food and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and
anarchy do not return” (p. 1705). Ours is a primarily a peacekeeping mission — as Clinton says,

“we did not go to Somalia with a military purpose” (p. 1704-1705). After this mission of

peacekeeping is complete, African nations will be able to help “build a settlement among the
Somali people that can preserve order and security” (p. 1705).

Another nation which is enveloped in chaos, according to Clinton, is Haiti. He says that

one of the goals of our intervention here is “to secure our borders, and to preserve stability”
(1994a, p. 1558). Specifically, Clinton refers to the “atrocities” occurring in Haiti —the
“terrifying pattern of soldiers and policemen raping the wives and daughters of suspected

political dissidents . . . people slain and mutilated, with body parts left as warnings to terrify

others” (p. 1558). “The terror, the desperation, and the instability will not end,” Clinton says,

until the Cedras regime is removed from power (p. 1560). Violence is rampant in Haiti, and it
has caused great instability. Children, for example, have “fled the orphanages for the streets”

and “can’t even sleep there because they’re so afraid” (p. 1558). If we do not act to end this

violence and instability, we could see a “wave of refugees at our door” (p. 1559). Clinton says
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that there may even be a “mass exodus of refugees” which will create a “constant threat to
stability in our region and control of our borders” (p. 1559). Clinton elaborates on this idea that

instability in Haiti could create instability in America:
History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere

strengthens America’s security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely

to keep the peace and to stabilize our region . . . Restoring Haiti’s democratic

government will help lead to more stability and prosperity in our region, just as
our actions in Panama and Grenada did. (p. 1560)

As if these appeals were not enough, Clinton suggests that we should be mindful of this situation
because even countries from the other side of the world are concerned. “More than 20 countries

from around the world,” including Poland, Israel, Jordan, Bangladesh, Belgium and Great Britain
have “agreed to join us because they think this problem in our neighborhood is important to their

future interests and their security” (p. 1559). The situation in Haiti affects not only the stability
of Haiti and the United States, but the stability of the world.
Interestingly, less than one month later, in his speech on October 10, 1994 on Iraq,

Clinton begins by updating listeners on the situation in Haiti. He says that the dictators who

brought so much instability to Haiti have resigned and that “President Aristide will return home

to resume his rightful place” soon (1994b, p. 1725). All this is because of the hard work of our
troops who are “keeping America’s commitment to restore democracy” (p. 1726). “The level of
violence is down,” Clinton says, “the Parliament is back, refugees are returning from
Guantanamo” (p. 1725). Order has been restored.

Clinton speaks of the need for stability in Europe in his two addresses on the region
formerly known as Yugoslavia. In his address on implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, he says that we must act to “bring stability to Central Europe” (1995, p. 1784). For
the past four years, he says, “a terrible war has tom Bosnia apart” (p. 1784-1785). As in other
speeches, Clinton describes the chaos of war, with shelling turning civilian marketplaces and
playgrounds into “killing fields” (p. 1785). “Two million people,” he says, “half the population,

were forced from their homes and into a miserable life as refugees” (p. 1785). Ending this
bloodshed will secure peace in Bosnia, and it will help make Europe more stable as well. As

Clinton puts it,
Securing peace in Bosnia will also help to build a free and stable Europe. Bosnia

lies at the very heart of Europe, next-door to many of its fragile new democracies
and some of our closest allies. Generations of Americans have understood that
Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability is [sic] vital to our own national security.

We must act with our NATO partners, Clinton says, or the chaos of war will resume —“the peace
will collapse; the war will reignite, the slaughter of innocents will begin again” (p. 1785. And,
the conflict “could spread like poison throughout the region, [and] eat away at Europe’s

stability” (p. 1786). By acting, we will stop the spread of instability and allow “the people of
Bosnia . . . [to] return to their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives” (p.

1786).'

In his second address concerning the former Yugoslavia, Clinton again refers to the idea
of acting in order to preserve the stability of Europe. We are acting, he says, against the Serbian
army which is “responsible for the brutality in Kosovo” (1999, par. 1). This brutality has caused

“tens of thousands of people” to flee to the hills (par. 5). Without our intervention, Clinton says,
the people of Kosovo will not be able to live in their own homes “without having to fear for their

own lives” (par. 18). “This is not a war in the traditional sense,” he says, but it is rather “an

I
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attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people” (par. 7). And it may spread, if we
do not act now: “we act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe
that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results” (par. 2). Kosovo “sits
on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East,” and “all around Kosovo there

are other small countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges —
countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo” (par. 8).
Clinton reminds us that a few years earlier, “two million Bosnians became refugees” (par. 10)

when a similar war broke out in that region.
There is great instability in Kosovo, Clinton is saying, and it will spread if we do not stop
it. If we do not act to put an end to this instability, “there will be many more massacres, tens of

thousands more refugees, more victims crying out for revenge” (par. 17). These refugees are
already spreading to neighboring countries, Clinton says, and “already, this movement is
threatening the young democracy in Macedonia” (par. 20). Clinton claims that the instability
that follows these refugees into other lands could eventually draw “key U. S. allies” into “a

wider conflict” (par. 20). Clinton summarizes this argument when he says:
If we’ve learned anything from the century drawing to a close, it is that if

America is going to be prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is
prosperous, secure, undivided and free. We need a Europe that is coming

together, not falling apart; a Europe that shares our values and shares the burdens

or leadership. That is the foundation on which the security of our children will
depend, (par. 22)
This “vision of a peaceful, secure, united, stable Europe” involves “ending instability in the
Balkans so that these bitter ethnic problems in Europe are resolved [with] the force of argument,

I
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not the force of arms” (par. 24). Clinton reminds us that instability in this region led to World

War I and that “World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region” (par. 9). This vision of a

stable and secure Europe is therefore necessary in order to keep our own nation stable. In short,
“our children need and deserve a peaceful, stable, free Europe” (par. 25).

Clinton further addresses the issue of stability in his speech to the nation on the bombing
of suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. He portrays the group led by Osama
bin Laden as promoting chaos, fear and destruction throughout the world. “Our target was

terror,” Clinton (1998a, par. 2) says. We have undertaken military action against bin Laden, “the
preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today” (par. 2). Bin

Laden and his followers practice “a distortion of their religion” and “justify the murder of
innocents” (par. 3). These terrorists have

killed . . . peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the President of
Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s over the

Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down

tourists in Egypt, (par. 5)
And recently, these terrorists have bombed two United States embassies, where “12 Americans
and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives” (par. 6). These acts, according to
Clinton, were designed to undermine the rule of law and to create fear and chaos. The very

mention of specific terrorist activities suggests chaos and instability— what if innocent

peacekeepers lived in fear for their lives? What if world leaders were assassinated? What if

airline passengers and international tourists had to constantly look over their shoulders for fear
of being murdered? If bin Laden and his associates had their way, Clinton suggests, the world

would be a much less stable place. The mere mention of terrorism conjures up images of chaos
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and destruction — by mentioning these specific (planned) acts, Clinton conjures up images of
instability by reminding listeners that people live in fear when they are constantly on the lookout

for terrorist violence.
- Clinton elaborates on this idea when he says that our battle against terrorism is a “long,

ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism” (par.
14). It will continue to be a struggle which will help those “who want to live free of fear and
violence” (par. 17). In this struggle, we have taken steps already which are designed to promote

stability around the world. We have “quietly disrupted terrorist groups and foiled their plots.
We have isolated countries that practice terrorism. We’ve worked to build and international

coalition against terror” (par. 7). American “law enforcement” has been used to “bring to trial

those guilty of attacks” on American soil (par. 7). Clinton says he ordered air strikes against

these terrorist facilities because not doing so “would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability
and their willingness to strike us intact” (par. 16) — we have acted in order to stop bin Laden’s

ability to create chaos around the world.
Saddam Hussein, a recurring figure in Clinton’s crisis rhetoric, is portrayed as a rogue
leader and the creator of great instability in the Persian Gulf. Evidence of this is given by

Clinton in three separate speeches concerning military action against Iraq.
The first of these occurred in 1993 when Clinton announced that he had ordered air
strikes against Iraq because of a plot by Hussein to assassinate former President George Bush.

Clinton says that Hussein has “demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or
aggression if left unchecked,” and has supported “outlaw behavior” over the years (1993a, p.

938). Iraq has “repeatedly refused” to “return to the community of nations,” and Clinton warns

Hussein not to “contemplate further illegal actions” (p. 939). The “illegal actions” Clinton is
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referring to include an alleged plot by Iraqi intelligence to “assassinate former President George
Bush” (p. 938). This plot, Clinton says, is nothing less than terrorism; we must oppose such
terrorism clearly and forcefully, not only to “deter further violence against our people,” but to
“affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations” (p. 938). A leader like Saddam

Hussein, Clinton suggests, is dangerous because he refuses to cooperate with the rest of the
world and will even resort to “loathsome and cowardly” terrorist acts (p. 938), acts which create

instability by their very nature. As he points out, “America’s security has depended on the

clarity of this message: Don’t tread on us” p. 938). We must keep order in the world, especially
when it concerns our own citizens, because our national security depends on it.

Clinton’s second speech concerning Iraq and Saddam Hussein begins with a direct
reference to stability and order. He says that America is taking actions “to preserve stability in

the Persian Gulf in the face of Saddam Hussein’s provocative actions” (1994b, p. 1725). Iraq
has been massing troops along the Kuwaiti border, Clinton says, and “the United States and the

international community have given their word that Iraq must respect the borders of its
neighbors” (p. 1726). He reminds us of the Gulf War and says that our mission to keep the

region stable continues:

Three and a half years ago, the men and women of our armed forces, under the
strong leadership of President Bush, General Powell, and General Schwartzkopf,

fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to protect our interests in that vital region.

Today we remain committed to defending the integrity of that nation and to

protecting the stability of Gulf region, (p. 1726).
Clinton says that Hussein’s recent actions — assembling troops along the Kuwaiti border —are

similar to his actions in 1990 when he “assembled a force on the border .. . and then invaded”

a
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(p. 1726). Because Hussein “cannot be trusted” (p. 1726), we must assume that his intention is
to violate the sanctity of Kuwait’s borders and once again bring war and instability to the Persian
Gulf. “We will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors,” Clinton says (p. 1726). Iraq’s only

option is “full compliance, not reckless provocation” (p. 1726). This compliance will help to

preserve “Kuwait’s freedom and the security of the Gulf’ (p. 1726). By sending troops to the

Gulf now, America is working to “make the world a safer place” and is “making progress in
building a world of greater security, peace, and democracy” (p. 1726).
In his third speech on Iraq, Clinton again states that Hussein “must not be allowed to

threaten his neighbors or the world” (1998b, par. 1). This time Hussein is creating potential
instability not with troop movements, but with his refusal to allow United Nations inspectors to
search for weapons of mass destruction, including “nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological

weapons” (par. 1). Hussein’s “deception has defeated their [the inspectors’] effectiveness” (par.
16). By hiding evidence and now by refusing to allow inspections, he is presenting “a clear and
present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere” (par. 17).

He is behaving recklessly, and Clinton tells Hussein “if you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy
price” (par. 22). The United States will fight instability and has undertaken military action in

order to “degrade his [Hussein’s] ability to threaten his neighbors” (par. 22). Clinton sums up
the idea that America is a force for stability while Hussein is an agent of chaos when he says
In the century we’re leaving, America has often made the difference between

chaos and community; fear and hope. Now, in a new century, we’ll have a

remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past —but only if

we stand strong against the enemies of peace, (par. 34)

=
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One of those enemies of peace — and stability — is clearly Saddam Hussein.
In each of the eight speeches detailed above, Clinton describes instability and chaos as

“enemies” that must be defeated. Whether that instability takes place because of anarchy
(Somalia), political and ethnic atrocities and the resulting flood of refugees (Haiti, Bosnia,

Kosovo), terrorism (the bin Laden “network”), or rogue nations threatening war (Saddam
Hussein and Iraq), it is a force to be reckoned with. Instability has replaced communism as the

theme against which foreign policy is explained within the prophetic dualism model. The idea

of prophetic dualism no longer focuses on communism as America’s evil enemy; it now focuses
on instability and disorder as the forces of evil. America is still the force of righteousness —
democracy is promoted through military intervention designed to counteract the forces of

instability rather than the forces of communism.
Evaluation of the Power Politics, New World Order, and Cold War Dramas

In each of his eight speeches to the nation announcing military action, Clinton draws on

three distinct dramatic forms to construct arguments justifying the use of that action. He
provides arguments based on America’s best interests (technocratic realism and Power Politics)

and arguments based on the best interests of the world community (the New World Order). The
Cold War drama obviously cannot be used in exactly the same way as it was in that past, since
the Cold War is now over. However, Clinton draws on the idea of prophetic dualism, a key to
the Cold War drama. And, as we have seen, instability and chaos have replaced communism as

our enemy in the prophetic dualism model. Clinton’s crisis rhetoric therefore contains elements

of the Power Politics drama, the New World Order drama and a modified version of the Cold

War drama.

Crisis Rhetoric 70
The major goal of this study is to determine what, if any, worldview has come to replace

the Cold War as justification for military intervention. It is clear that the Cold War drama has
been significantly modified now that institutionalized communism is no longer a perceived —or
expressed — threat. So, according to the rhetoric of Bill Clinton, the fight against communism is
not an overriding theme in foreign policy. Clinton does rely on the New World Order and Power

Politics dramas, however. These two appear contradictory at first, but Clinton does indeed
provide arguments for military intervention based on America’s self-interests as well as

arguments based on the subversion of our own interests to the interests of the “world
community.” One might conclude, as Stuckey (1995) has, that post-Cold War presidents are left
searching for a world view that can justify foreign policy in a variety of circumstances and that
as a result, each case must be justified on its own merits. However, there does appear to be one

overriding theme to Clinton’s crisis rhetoric.

I
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Chapter 3:

The Search for a New Foreign Policy; the United States as the “World’s Policeman”

i This study was undertaken to determine how Clinton uses the Power Politics, New World

Order and Cold War dramas. In undertaking this analysis, another drama unexpectedly emerged.
This narrative or theme is that of the “world’s policemen” or “policeman.” This drama is

specifically referenced by Clinton when he says “I know that the United States cannot, indeed

we should not, be the world’s policemen” (Clinton, 1994a, p. 1559), and “America cannot and
must not be the world’s policeman” (Clinton, 1995, p. 1784). Clinton makes these statements as

if to suggest that American military involvement should not be thought of as police-like action;
however, it is clear by looking at the dramatic and metaphorical elements in his addresses that
police action is an appropriate frame through which to view American foreign policy.

In this Chapter, I argue that the World’s Policeman drama ought to be considered a
fourth paradigm that can help us to understand American foreign policy. The World’s
Policeman drama serves to characterize the United States as a hero working to bring peace

throughout the world through police-type actions. Villains in this drama are those who bring
instability, chaos, violence and unrest. These villains are compared to criminals in that they

have no respect for law and order and the sanctity of human life. The World’s Policeman model
serves as a master metaphor, much in the way that the Cold War served as a master metaphor for
roughly forty years: it generates other metaphors and guides our view of the world. By relying
on this drama and the metaphors it generates, Clinton reveals an ideology that justifies the use of

military force — this ideology is present in each and every address in which he announces

military action. As we shall see, this drama subsumes the other three dramas thus far analyzed.
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Clinton relies on the Power Politics, New World Order and modified Cold War dramas; all three

of these dramas can be seen as part of the World’s Policeman drama.

Analysis
Clinton’s first address to the nation on military intervention easily fits the mold of a
police action. He describes a crime (the plot to assassinate former President Bush) which has
been investigated by police agencies (intelligence and law enforcement), the verdict (guilty), and

the punishment that has been meted out (bombing of Iraqi intelligence headquarters). Clinton
says that a “car bombing plot to assassinate former President George Bush” has been uncovered

(1993a, p. 938). Kuwaiti authorities, who discovered this plot, “arrested 16 suspects” (p. 938).
At this time, Clinton says,

I ordered our own intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct a
thorough and independent investigation. Over the past several weeks, officials
from those agencies reviewed a range of intelligence information, traveled to

Kuwait and elsewhere, extensively interviewed the suspects, and thoroughly

examined the forensic evidence, (p. 938)

Clinton specifically mentions “law enforcement” and also uses police terminology like
“investigation,” the “interviewing” of “suspects” and “forensic evidence.” These words serve to
compare American actions to the actions of police who investigate crimes by interviewing

witnesses and searching through forensic evidence. “Based on their investigation,” he says,
“there is compelling evidence” that this plot did indeed exist (p. 938). This compelling evidence
has led Clinton to conclude that this plot was real and to order cruise missile attacks on Iraq (p.

938). Clinton later refers to “Iraq’s crime” (p. 938), Saddam Hussein’s support of “outlaw
behavior” (p. 938) and his regime’s contemplation of “further illegal provocative actions” (p.
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939). He says that our “law enforcement agencies who carried out the investigation” are worthy

of praise for their work (p. 939). By describing the events in Iraq and Kuwait in this manner,

Clinton portrays the situation as one in which police-type agencies have investigated a crime,
Clinton himself has declared Iraq guilty, and has ordered Iraq to be punished. Thus, the United

States is an agent of law enforcement — investigating crimes and responding with swift action

when necessary.
Another case that clearly fits the police drama is Clinton’s speech announcing the
bombing of suspected terrorist facilities. Clinton begins by detailing the crimes that have been

committed. He says that terrorist groups, led by Osama bin Laden, have “killed ...

peacekeepers, ” “plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope,” “planned to bomb

six United States 747s,” “bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan” and “gunned down German
tourists in Egypt” (1998a, par. 5). More recently, they have bombed American embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where “12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost

their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded” (par. 6). The perpetrators of this crime have been
uncovered by “law enforcement’’(par. 7) and “intelligence” (par. 6) sources. As Clinton says,
There is convincing information from our intelligence community that the bin

1 Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings. Based on this
information, we have high confidence that these bombings were planned,
financed, and carried out by the organization bin Laden leads, (par. 6)

This passage suggests that an investigation was carried out and that from this investigation, bin
Laden and his followers have been identified as suspects.
Further suggestion of the role of police-type agencies in tracking terrorists comes when
Clinton reminds listeners that
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America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we’ve used law
enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American

law has reached out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of attacks

• in New York and Virginia and in the Pacific. We have quietly disrupted terrorist

groups and foiled their plots, (par. 7).
According to Clinton, America has long acted as a police-agent as it has investigated crimes by

terrorists — this practice continues today. Particularly important are Clinton’s mention of “law
enforcement. . . tools,” the “long arm of the law,” and bringing “to trial” the guilty parties. By

using these types of phrases, Clinton compares United States foreign policy against terrorism to
police action. This use of metaphor suggests that Government agencies act as police do:
investigating crimes, tracking down criminals, and bringing them before the courts.

Clinton further invokes police-like images by mentioning “law enforcement” several

times. He expresses “gratitude to our intelligence and law enforcement agencies” (par. 12) and

says that this is “a long, ongoing struggle between ... the rule of law and terrorism” (par. 14).

Clinton also says that “there have been, and will be, times when law enforcement.. . tools are
simply not enough” (par. 8). He says that with “compelling evidence” that the bin Laden

network “was planning to mount further attacks” (par. 8), the time for military intervention has
come. In order to “defend our people,” as well as people “in all parts of the world, who want to
live free of fear and violence” (par. 17), Clinton says he has ordered air strikes against suspected

facilities run by bin Laden and his followers. This speech is similar to Clinton’s first speech in
that a crime (terrorist bombings) has been investigated (by law enforcement), a verdict has been
rendered, and punishment has been delivered (bombing of terrorist facilities). In this case,
Clinton points out that normally, government’s role in this police action would result in a trial,

to
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but because of the imminent threat of further terrorist acts, air strikes will serve as punishment.
Clinton’s address on Haiti also contains elements of the police drama. Clinton details the
crimes committed by Haiti’s dictator, including “executing children, raping women, killing

priests” (1994a, p. 1558). In describing these acts he says that reporters have “documented the
slaying of Haitian orphans,” and that a priest “was murdered” — “executed on the doorstep of his

home” (p. 1558). “International observers,” he says, have uncovered a pattern of Haitian
soldiers “raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents” (p. 1558). Clinton
says that in light of these crimes, “the United Nations Security Council [has] approved a

resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to remove the Haitian
dictators from power” (p. 1559). The United States will be joined, he says, by nations who

understand that “this problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests and their
security” (p. 1559). At this point in the speech, Clinton makes an interesting statement. He says:
The United States cannot, indeed we should not, be the world’s policemen. And I

know that this is a time with the Cold War over that so many Americans are
reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But
when brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we

have a responsibility to act. (p. 1559)
This statement appears to be designed as a counter-argument to those who would call this a
police action. Clinton concedes that we should not try to be the world’s policemen, but,
considering the proximity of Haiti to the United States, we really have no choice. So his

counter-argument really serves to legitimize this as a police action. It is almost as if Clinton has

said “I know we cannot be the world’s policemen all the time, but in this case, we must be.”
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Clinton goes on to say that our military intervention will have two parts. First, we will
“remove [the] dictators from power” (p. 1560) and restore Haiti’s rightful government. Then, he

says,
- We will train a civilian-controlled Haitian security force that will protect the
people rather than repress them. During this period, police monitors from all

around the world will work with the authorities to maximize basic security and
civil order and minimize retribution, (p. 1560)

This statement is filled with references to police action — “security forces” will “protect”

citizens, “police monitors” and “the authorities” will make Haiti safe and keep it civilized. The
dramatic elements of this speech and Clinton’s choice of words serve to portray this particular
use of military force as a police action. Cedras and his “thugs” (p. 1558) are out-of-control

criminals; American military intervention is the police action that will bring them to justice and

restore peace and order to Haiti.
Clinton describes our mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a peacekeeping mission. He
says that our role will be not about fighting a war, but about “helping the people of Bosnia to
secure their own peace agreement” (1995, p. 1784). We have the opportunity, Clinton says, to

“help stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially children” (p. 1784). Specifically, he says,
we have already used our military to “enforce a no-fly zone” and have “helped to make peace
between two of the three warring parties” (p. 1785). A new peace agreement has been made,

Clinton says, in which the three ethnic groups in Bosnia have “agreed to put down their guns, to
preserve Bosnia as a single state, to investigate and prosecute war criminals, to protect the

human rights of all citizens, to try to build a peaceful, democratic future” (p. 1785). Our role in
Bosnia, in other words, is to stop the killing of civilians by “enforcing” the agreement that
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Bosnians have made, which includes the investigation and prosecution of criminals as well as
keeping the peace. The Bosnian factions have already said they will “put down their guns,” it is
up to us to make sure they do so. We must “help to secure the Bosnian peace”; we have the

chance to “build a peace and stop the suffering” in Bosnia (p. 1785). In order to do this,

American troops will “maintain the cease-fire” and “help create a secure environment” (p.
1786).
Thus, American military involvement in Bosnia can be seen as another police action.

Our role is described as upholding the peace agreement, much as the police uphold the law.
Again, Clinton portrays our actions as police-like while arguing against our becoming the

“world’s policeman.”

America cannot and must not be the world’s policeman. We cannot stop all war
for all time, but we can stop some wars. We cannot save all women and all
children, but we can save many of them. We can’t do everything, but we must do

what we can. (p. 1784)

This seems to be an argument for limited police-like involvement around the world. Much like
his similar comments in his address concerning Haiti, Clinton seems to be arguing that while we

should not see ourselves as the world’s policeman (or police/we^), certain circumstances demand
that we act in just such a capacity; at times we must enforce peace, investigate criminals, quell

unrest and uphold the rule of law. This view of America’s role in the world is necessary and has

certain benefits, according to Clinton. We are vulnerable to “ethnic, religious, and regional
rivalries; the spread of organized crime and weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking”
(p. 1784). Note Clinton’s use ofthe phrases “organized crime” and “drug trafficking.” These

forces, as well as the others mentioned, “threaten freedom and democracy” (p. 1784), thereby
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demanding our attention. Police-like intervention creates “a chance to build a peace and stop the

suffering” (p. 1785) and “is the right thing to do” (p. 1784). By acting in this way in Bosnia —
and by extension, in other similar circumstances — “we can defend our fundamental values as a

people and serve our most basic, strategic interests” (p. 1784).
Clinton’s speech on Kosovo is similar to his speech on Bosnia, in that both instances of

military involvement are portrayed as actions that will help to make the world safer through the
“enforcement” of peace. Clinton says that the people of Kosovo have been “stripped of their
constitutional autonomy” and denied the right to “speak their language, run their schools, shape

their daily lives” (1999, par. 4). The Kosovars have “struggled peacefully to get their rights
back” (par. 4), but the Serbians, led by Slobodan Milosevic, have responded violently by

“shelling civilians” and shooting “innocent people” in “cold blood” (par. 7). Milosevic has “sent
his troops and police to crush” the Kosovars. To make matters worse, Clinton implies, America

and its allies have recently proposed a peace agreement, which Serbia has “refused even to
discuss” (par. 6). Kosovo wants peace, but Serbia wants war. Therefore, Clinton says, America

and its NATO allies have “agreed to do what we said we would do, what we must do to restore

the peace” (par. 14). America and NATO will enforce the peace if Serbia will not agree to do so
willingly. As Clinton says, “if President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability

to make war” (par. 14).

The use of military force in Kosovo is likened to police action in that it is described as a
peace-keeping mission. Clinton says we will do “what we must do to restore the peace” (par.

14). He explains that he does not “intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” but that
these troops will be a “peace-keeping force” (par. 16). By acting now we are “advancing the

cause for peace” (par. 2). This action is also one designed to protect the people of Kosovo; we

L
-
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must act to help “defenseless people” (par. 17) who are in “fear for their own lives” (par. 18).

Clinton also uses the word “security” many times: our actions will help make Europe “secure”
(par. 22); a stable Europe is essential for “the security of our children” (par. 22); we must meet
the challenge of a “peaceful, secure, united, stable Europe” (par. 23). Thus, as in Bosnia,

American military force is needed in order to restore peace and order in an unstable region of the

world. This action can be seen as a police drama because of the elements of peace-keeping and

protection for the population against those who have been described as oppressive and even
criminal.
Two of Clinton’s addresses contain less detailed and lengthy use of the World’s

Policeman drama and use of police-type metaphors. However, these speeches also add to the

overall image of the United States as police officer or police agency.
In Clinton’s second address to the nation concerning military action, he details the

“anarchy” in Somalia that has drawn American involvement. These images of anarchy are
contrasted with images of American troops who have “created a secure environment” (1993b, p.
1704). These troops are in Somalia to “keep the peace” (p. 1704). “We did not go to Somalia

with a military purpose” Clinton says (p. 1704-1705), but to “keep open and secure the roads, the
port, and the lines of communication” (p. 1705). American troops are in Somalia to “prevent a
return to anarchy” (p. 1705). Clinton points out that our role will be supplemented with efforts
of other nations who will “deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain

when we’re gone” and will “preserve order and security” (p. 1705). The situation in Somalia is

one in which anarchy has created the need for military intervention, much in the same way that
police would intervene in a riot in order to “keep the peace.” Clinton’s narrative of the situation

creates images of police action; so too do his repeated references to “anarchy,” “ order” and
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“security.”
In his second address to the nation concerning Iraq, Clinton says we must “preserve
stability in the Persian Gulf’ (1994b, p. 1725). We must “remain committed to defending the

integrity of that nation [Kuwait] and to protecting the stability of the Gulf region” (p. 1726).

Saddam Hussein has been caught in the act of massing troops along Kuwait’s border, much as he

did in 1990 before invading the country. Clinton says that “this provocation requires a strong

response” (p. 1726). “We will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors or to intimidate the United
Nations” (p. 1726). Thus, Iraq’s crime is threatening its neighbors and preparing for what looks

like an invasion. Our response will help to “make the world a safer place” by protecting

“Kuwait’s freedom and the security of the Gulf’ (p. 1726). Overall, Clinton says, by acting in
this way we are “making progress in building a world of greater security, peace, and democracy”

(p. 1726). The emphasis in these statements is on protection, security, safety and peace. The

role of America, much like the role of the police, is one of keeping the peace and keeping people
safe from harm. We must protect Kuwait from Iraq much as the police protect citizens from

criminals.
Clinton’s third speech on Iraq involves a more lengthy comparison of American military
intervention to police action. This speech involves the role of United Nations weapons

inspectors who have recently been expelled from the nation. These investigators/inspectors are
“highly professional experts” whose job is “to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s capability to

retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction” (1998b, par. 3). These weapons have been
used by Saddam Hussein in various ways in the past — including “unleashing chemical weapons

against Iranian troops, ” “firing Scud missiles” at the citizens of neighboring countries, and

“gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq” (par. 4). Hussein’s use of such “terrible weapons”

>:
)
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(par. 5) has made it necessary for weapons inspectors to ensure that he “not be allowed to

threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons” (par.

1). Thus, the background for the current police action is a police action itself — because of his
breaking of international “laws” by using these types of weapons, Hussein is now under constant

investigation by United Nations weapons inspectors. One might say that he is “on parole.” And

he has violated that parole.
Saddam Hussein, Clinton says, announced “six weeks ago” that he would “no longer

cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors” (par. 3). “The U. N. Security Council,”
he says, “voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam’s actions and to demand that he immediately

come into compliance” (par. 6). “U. N. weapons inspectors” were sent back to Iraq to carry “out
their plan for testing Iraq’s cooperation” (par. 10). At this point, “Iraq repeatedly blocked
UNSCOM [the inspectors] from inspecting suspect sites” (par. 12). Clinton details this

obstruction by saying that
Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM’s ability to obtain necessary evidence. For

example, Iraq obstructed UNSCOM’s effort to photograph bombs related to its
chemical weapons program. It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons

1 team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents, and prevented Iraqi

personnel from answering UNSCOM’s questions, (par. 13)
Furthermore, Iraq has “emptied out. . . building[sj,” “ failed to turn over ... documents,” and

“ordered the destruction of weapons related documents” (par. 14). In short, Iraq’s crime is

likened to obstruction of justice - Saddam Hussein has attempted to thwart a legitimate
investigation. As Clinton puts it, “instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has

disarmed the inspectors” (par. 16).

I
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Thus, military action is required. The situation, Clinton says, “presents a clear and
present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere” (par. 17).

The use of force and the threat of the use of force, he says, are “the surest way to contain
Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf

War” (par. 27). We must strike against Iraq in order to force Saddam Hussein to comply with
the weapons inspectors. The investigation must continue in order for the world to be assured
that Iraq will not use chemical or biological weapons or attack its neighbors in the future. The

military action that Clinton announces in this speech is different from other military actions that
fit the police drama. America is not intervening in order to restore the peace as much as we are

intervening in order to keep the peace in the future. And in order to achieve that goal, we must
first restore the system of weapons inspection, which is a police action in itself. In order to keep

the peace, Iraq must be made to understand the importance of letting these investigations

continue unobstructed.

Interpretation

Clinton’s rhetoric announcing military intervention contains elements of what can be
described as the World’s Policeman drama. Of course, images of the police mean different
things to different people. But by looking at Clinton’s word choice and the unfolding of his

narratives describing military intervention, one can see various police-type actions at work.

Clinton describes the goals of various actions as investigating and solving crimes (Iraqi plot to
assassinate President Bush, terrorist activities), protecting innocent people from lawless villains
(Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq), maintaining the peace (Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia), and even

enforcing conditions of “parole” (Iraq weapons inspection). Thus, a common theme to Clinton’s
crisis rhetoric is that of the police drama; just as the police have different roles, so too does the
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United States military as it plays out this drama.
Importance of the World’s Policeman Drama

One especially important point needs to be made — the World’s Policeman drama
incorporates the Power Politics, New World Order and modified Cold War dramas. It is in
America’s best interest to keep the world stable and secure. It is in the world community’s best
interest that America keep the peace as well. And police action is the “right” solution to the

“wrongs” — including instability and chaos — being perpetrated by America’s enemies. The view
of America as the “world’s policeman” can be seen as the dominant theme through which

American military intervention is portrayed. It subsumes the other dramas mentioned; doing
what is right for America (Power Politics/technocratic realism) is a part of police action, doing
what is best for all parties involved (the New World Order) is a part of police action, and acting

as an agent of good fighting agents of evil (prophetic dualism) is naturally a part of all police
actions. Finally, as we shall see, the police drama fits as an overriding theme of foreign policy as

it allows for the idea that America must be the standard of liberty and freedom that all other
nations can strive for —by being the world’s policeman, America can provide the opportunity for
stability and democracy, much as the police provide stability and freedom by protecting law

abiding citizens from the instability of crime and anarchy.
Providing the Opportunity for Stability

Clinton describes instability in different ways, as we have seen. He also describes

different solutions for the problems caused by this instability. The most immediate solution is,
of course, military intervention, but beyond that, Clinton specifically references freedom and

democracy as the cure to these problems. It is the duty of the United States, he suggests, to
provide stability throughout the world by providing nations with the “opportunity” to experience

I
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freedom and democracy.

In Somalia, for example, Clinton says that when we have achieved our mission goals,
“we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance” to “find a political solution to their problems”
(1993b, p. 1705). Clinton says that it is not our job to tell the Somalis what to do, but it is our

responsibility to give them the chance to experience stability.
It is not our job to rebuild Somalia’s society or even to create a political process
that can allow Somalia’s clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do

that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than

willing to help. But we, we in the United States must decide whether we will
give them enough time to have a reasonable chance to succeed, (p. 1704)

We are not enforcing peace, rather, we are providing “opportunity” which will ultimately
“preserve order and security” (p. 1705). We will be giving the Somalis “a decent chance to

survive” (p. 1704).
In his speech on Haiti, Clinton says we must “promote democracy in our hemisphere” by

intervening in that nation (1994a, p. 1558). He points out that Cuba and Haiti are the only
countries in the Western Hemisphere where “dictators have managed to hold back the wave of
democracy and progress . . . that our own Government has so actively promoted and supported

for years” (p. 1559). Clinton says that “there’s no question that the Haitian people want to

embrace democracy” (p. 1559); they have gone “to the ballot box and told the world” (p. 1559).

Haiti is a nation in which “the people actually elected their own government and chose
democracy, only to have tyrants steal it away” (p. 1559). This is why we must intervene. We

must act in order to “give democracy a chance, not to guarantee it; to remove stubborn and cruel

dictators, not to impose a future” (p. 1560). Clinton says that we should “help the Haitian people

I
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recover their democracy and fmd their hard-won freedoms” (p. 1560).

In Bosnia, Clinton also portrays our role as one of providing opportunity. America’s

military role in the region, he says, is “about helping the people of Bosnia to secure their own
peace agreement” (1995, p. 1784). Therefore, our role has not been to “fight a war in Bosnia,”

but has been a role of “searching for peace, stopping the war from spreading, and easing the
suffering of the Bosnian people” (p. 1785). This work has led to a peace agreement, Clinton
says, in which Bosnians of all ethnic backgrounds will “try to build a peaceful, democratic

future” (p. 1785). Bosnians have “asked for America’s help” (p. 1785), and in order to give

them this help,
troops from our country and around the world would go into Bosnia to give them

the confidence and support they need to implement their peace plan. I refuse to

send American troops to fight a war in Bosnia, but I believe we must help to
secure the Bosnian peace, (p. 1785)

As he orders American troops into Bosnia, Clinton is careful to point out that they are not there

“to fight,” but are there to provide the opportunity for Bosnians to experience stability and
democracy. As he puts it, “American leadership created the chance to build a peace and stop the
suffering” (p. 1785). The presence of our troops will allow Bosnians to “return to their homes
[and] vote in free elections” (p. 1786). Because of American military intervention, Clinton says,
“the people of Bosnia can have the chance to decide their future in peace” (p. 1787).

Clinton also describes our role as providing opportunity in his address announcing air

strikes against Serbia, although his argument is a bit more complex and his choice of words is a
bit different. He says that Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic, has “stripped Kosovo of the
constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed; thus denying them their right to speak their
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language, run their schools, shape their daily lives” (1999, par. 4). America, Clinton says, “has

proposed a peace agreement to end the fighting for good” (par. 5). The people of Kosovo have
accepted this agreement, but Serbia has “refused even to discuss key elements of the peace

agreement” and has instead moved troops into the region “in preparation for a major offensive”
(par. 6). This major offensive, according to Clinton, has included “shelling civilians” and killing
“innocent people” (par. 7). We must intervene in order to “restore the peace” (par. 14) and help

ensure that Europe will be “undivided and free” (par. 22). Clinton again is careful to point out

that American troops are being sent to foreign lands not to wage war, but to provide peace and
opportunity. “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” he says (par. 16). This

action is intended to make Milosevic “accept the peace agreement and demilitarize Kosovo”
(par. 16). Ultimately, Clinton says, peace and stability in Kosovo will lead to a “Europe that is

prosperous, secure, undivided and free” (par. 22). Thus, our intervention against Serbia will
provide the people of Kosovo the opportunity to experience the freedom to “shape their daily

lives” and to enjoy their own “constitutional autonomy,” and will ultimately help to make
Europe more free.

Clinton does not use this strategy in all of his speeches announcing military intervention,
but it is noteworthy because of its frequency. He is careful in the instances described above to
portray the role of America as providing opportunities for democracy and freedom rather than
forcing other people to accept our way of life. As he says in his second speech on Iraq, we are

working “for a post-cold-war world of democracy and prosperity” (1994b, p. 1726). This
I

I

approach to foreign policy is perhaps best illustrated when Clinton discusses America’s role as

i

he sees it:
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America has always been freedom’s greatest champion. If we continue to do

everything we can to share these blessings with people around the world, if we
continue to be leaders for peace, then the next century can be the greatest time

• our Nation has ever known. (1995, p. 1787)

Summary

The Cold War is over — in a time of “peace,” we do not engage in battles against
institutionalized evil, but in police actions against particular criminals or crimes against
humanity. Rather than fighting a war we are concerned with keeping the peace. The prophetic
dualism ideology is now a part of the World’s Policeman drama where the United States

enforces peace and “provides the opportunity” for stability. Technocratic realism and the Power
Politics drama are also a part of the World’s Policeman drama in which America’s best interests
are grounded in a peaceful world — a world in which America must often be the keeper of that
peace. And by protecting others from instability and chaos, America is setting aside its own

narrow self-interests for the good of others.

America provides the opportunity for democracy through its police actions. Thus,

democracy is the alternative to instability, much as democracy was the alternative to
communism in the past. And this democracy, in many instances, can only be experienced
through the peace provided by police action. Thus, Clinton proposes an alternative to instability
that can only be achieved through police action whereby the United States and other nations step

in to keep order. This action gives other people a chance for a more democratic form of
government that can only thrive in a stable environment. Both of these alternatives are described

not as imposing our form of government or order on disruptive peoples, but as the providing of
opportunity for the disadvantaged or abused.
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It must be noted once more that Clinton often denies the World’s Policeman drama even

as he relies on it for justification of military action. He says “I know that the United States
cannot, indeed we should not, be the world’s policemen” (1994a, p. 1559), and “America cannot
and must not be the world’s policeman” (1995, p. 1784). Clinton denies the metaphor even as
he uses it to bolster his arguments. Reasons for this may vary, and although it is perhaps beyond

the scope of this study to determine these reasons, others might follow up and attempt to

determine what role these denials play.
Perhaps Clinton is attempting to blunt criticisms of his actions. Anticipating that there
may not be widespread public support for police-like use of the military, Clinton may be

acknowledging his detractors in an attempt to head off criticism. By saying “I know we
shouldn 't be the world’s policeman, but this case is different,” he may be trying to convince
skeptics of the validity of his use of military force. Perhaps realizing that there is no consensus

among the American population as to our post-Cold War use of military strength, Clinton might

be attempting to carefully justify the use of that strength in police-like ways in particular
circumstances. Certainly, in post-Vietnam America, actions that portray our nation as the

“world’s policeman” may have lost a large part of their appeal. Indeed, when Clinton uses the

term “world’s policeman,” it is almost in a pejorative sense: he seems to suggest that no one

wants us to be thought of as the world’s policeman.

Perhaps these denials point to the fact that the World’s Policeman drama/master
metaphor does not hold the persuasive power that the Cold War once did. In any case, it most

certainly exists. As much as he tries to deny it, Clinton’s rhetoric clearly shows that he sees the
United States as the “world’s policeman”: he relies on the World’s Policeman drama and the

metaphors it creates as justification for military intervention in times of international crisis.
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Chapter 4:

Summary and Conclusion

i The Cold War drama no longer exists in the form it once did. With the Cold War over, it

is no surprise that President Clinton cannot rely on it as a means of justifying military action.
However, the prophetic dualism element of the Cold War drama still exists. Within his crisis
rhetoric, Clinton portrays the United States as an agent of good fighting the forces of evil. The
difference is that the evil Americans must fight against is not communism, but instability and

chaos.
The Power Politics and New World Order dramas are also used by Clinton to justify
military intervention. Rejustifies military action based on the self-interests of America using
the technocratic realism of the Power Politics drama. This drama is not concerned with moral

virtue, but focuses on positioning America in the most favorable way possible. Clinton is careful
to demonstrate that our actions will also benefit others by referencing the New World Order
drama. The New World Order drama draws on the use of metaphor for its effectiveness. The

“community of nations,” the “world community” and other metaphors serve to illustrate ideals of
the New World Order drama — particularly the notion that nations must do what is morally right

for all involved. What may appear on the surface to be contradicting dramas are woven together
in order to justify military action.
All three of these dramas are used by Clinton to justify military intervention. It has been
argued that post-Cold War presidents are left searching for an overriding theme to their crisis
rhetoric, and therefore attempt to combine these dramas as they make a case for each military

action independently (Stuckey, 1995). However, Clinton’s use of these differing dramas makes

Ill
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sense when one considers the World’s Policeman drama that appears throughout his crisis
rhetoric.

The World’s Policeman drama is one in which the hero — the United States — acts as the
“world’s policeman,” stepping in to keep the peace, quell unrest and violence and provide the

stability that civilized people desire. The villains in this drama are riotous mobs, anarchists,
dictators who rule ruthlessly, rogue leaders who pick fights with other nations, terrorists, and
others who disregard the rule of law and the sanctity of life. The United States military is

compared with a police force, travelling around the world to stop “unlawful” behavior when duty
calls. This drama subsumes the other dramas mentioned in the following ways: it is in

America’s best interest to keep the peace and provide the opportunity for democracy; it is in the

world community’s best interest to allow America to help them keep the peace and to create
their own democratic forms of government, and; the police force — America — is a force of good
that fights the instability created by evil leaders, peoples and nations. Thus, Clinton’s use of the

Power Politics, New World Order and modified Cold War dramas, dramas which sometimes
have conflicting premises, makes sense when one looks at the overriding theme provided by the

World’s Policeman drama. Clinton is not searching for a replacement for the Cold War as an

ideological backdrop against which to paint his foreign policy: he has found it and he uses it.

This paper set out to determine if post-Cold War presidents would be left without an
overriding theme or ideology that can be used to justify military intervention. The crisis rhetoric

of Bill Clinton was analyzed using the Power Politics, New World Order and Cold War dramas.
Clinton was found to have used each of these dramas in his addresses to the nation announcing
military action. The Cold War drama, however, has been significantly altered now that the Cold
War itself is over. These speeches were also analyzed in terms of the metaphors used by
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Clinton. The New World Order drama was found to rely on the use of metaphor for its

effectiveness.
What is perhaps the most important finding of this paper came about unexpectedly.

Clinton was found to have relied on comparisons between military action and police action,

thereby establishing the basis for the World’s Policeman drama, which he has used to justify

American involvement in foreign lands. The World’s Policeman drama was found to contain a
rationale for each of the other three dramas. It has been further argued that the World’s
Policeman drama represents Clinton’s post-Cold War ideology; American military intervention

is justified by reliance on this drama, in which the United States acts as a law enforcement agent

striving to keep world peace.
Future studies ought to look for the origins of the World’s Policeman drama. Though

this study argues that this drama should be recognized as an overriding rationale for foreign

policy, it by no means assumes that the idea of the United States acting as the world’s policeman
is a new one. The Korean and Vietnam wars have been referred to as “police actions” — perhaps
other studies could look at the rhetoric surrounding these wars with an eye toward determining

the origins of the World’s Policeman as a drama that justifies the use of military force.
1 Future studies might also re-examine Cold War era rhetoric using the other dramas

outlined in this study. For example, scholars might find that dimensions of the Power Politics
drama — economic and geographic, for example — have been important parts of Cold War
rhetoric. The World’s Policeman drama ought to also be analyzed within Cold War era rhetoric.

Finally, future studies ought to further explore the use of the World’s Policeman drama

by Clinton and future presidents. It will be interesting to see if and how our next president relies
on this drama as justification for military action.
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